




Legal scholars have long been fascinated by the topic of government secrecy. Yet they 
have largely focused their attention on federal secrecy, rarely exploring secrecy in other 
contexts. This Article addresses this gap. It turns its attention to state and local 
government secrets, applying the lens of federal secrecy to the subfederal regime. In doing 
so, it identifies a troubling new development in state and local law: the migration of 
powerful federal secrecy protections, initially developed to shield the national security 
state, into the state and local context. I refer to this process as “secrecy creep.” 
By illuminating the architecture of state and local secrets, this Article makes three 
central contributions. First, it offers a descriptive account of subfederal secrecy. 
Second, it illuminates the process of secrecy creep, highlighting the ways that federal 
secrecy protections have migrated into state law to shield state and local governments. 
Third, it warns of the perils of this migration, arguing that these federal secrecy 
protections often sit uneasily within the distinct legal structures and traditions that 
exist at the state and local levels. 
Further, it reveals that secrecy creep raises special concerns in the context of 
policing. While the process of police militarization has received ample attention in 
recent years, this Article reveals the existence of a parallel intellectual trend—a kind 
of “national security-ization” of local police. These local law enforcement agencies 
have not only gained increased access to military weapons and the surveillance 
devices of the national security agencies, but they have also gained increased access to 
the robust informational protections that shield these weapons and tools from public 
view. This creates a feedback loop: the more that local police rely on military 
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equipment and federal surveillance technologies, the more persuasive their arguments 
for borrowing these federal secrecy protections become. In this way, illuminating the 
process of secrecy creep adds a new dimension to contemporary discussions of police 
power and constraints. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In September of 2010, Mark Zuckerberg and Cory Booker appeared on 
the Oprah Winfrey Show to announce that Zuckerberg was donating $100 
million to Newark’s public schools.1 At the time, Booker was serving as mayor 
of Newark; Zuckerberg, just twenty-six years old, still enjoyed his reputation 
as Silicon Valley wunderkind. The announcement was met with widespread 
praise.2 But before long, their reform efforts had stalled. Six months into the 
project, Booker had not appointed a new superintendent or drafted a 
comprehensive plan for education overhaul. Two years later, Booker’s 
administration had spent one-fifth of the donation—$20 million—on 
consulting fees alone.3 
In April of 2011, a group of Newark parents filed a public records request 
under New Jersey’s public records law for correspondence between Booker 
and Zuckerberg describing how the $100 million donation had been spent.4 
Booker’s office denied the request on a number of grounds. But one of its 
central claims was that the emails were protected by executive privilege.5 In 
its denial, Booker’s office cited Nero v. Hyland, a 1978 New Jersey Supreme 
Court decision recognizing an evidentiary privilege for the communications 
of the governor.6 Nero, in turn, relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1974 
1 Dale Russakoff, Schooled, NEW YORKER (May 12, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/ 
magazine/2014/05/19/schooled [https://perma.cc/DJ2D-LLF4]. 
2 See, e.g., Miguel Helft, From Young Mogul, A Gift on the Scale of Philanthropy’s Elders, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 24, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/25/technology/25facebook.html [https:// 
perma.cc/H3JA-3AW8]. 
3 Russakoff, supra note 1. 
4 Plaintiffs’ Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 1-2, 7-8, Secondary 
Parent Council v. City of Newark, No. L-6937-11 (N.J. Super. Ct., Dec. 6, 2011). 
5 Letter from Anna P. Pereira, Corporation Counsel, City of Newark, to Laura Baker, 
Secondary Parent Council (July 19, 2011), https://www.aclu-nj.org/download_file/view_inline/ 
783/632 [https://perma.cc/3ENS-AH4D]. 
6 Id.; Nero v. Hyland, 386 A.2d 846, 853 (N.J. 1978). 
1754 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 169: 1751 
decision in United States v. Nixon recognizing a qualified constitutional 
privilege for the communications of the President.7 
The privilege articulated in Nixon is robust, rooted in constitutional 
separation of powers principles, and tethered to the “unique” diplomatic 
and military responsibilities of the President.8 Even so, it had migrated 
into state law to shield gubernatorial records, and it was now being invoked 
to protect the emails of a city mayor—a position that has no formal role in 
the state constitutional scheme.9 The privilege had traveled far from its 
origins. This raised a number of questions. Should a city mayor enjoy an 
executive communications privilege? Should a governor? To what extent 
are the law and policy concerns that animate the presidential privilege 
applicable to state and local government? 
Scholars have long been fascinated by secrecy in government. Historians, 
political scientists, economists, and sociologists have examined all facets and 
corners of this topic.10 Legal scholars have not been immune to this trend. 
They, too, have explored fundamental questions about the federal secrecy 
ecosystem, asking what information the federal government should keep 
secret, what it does keep secret, and the process by which those secrets are 
either hidden or revealed.11 More recently, legal scholars have explored the 
ecosystem surrounding information leaks in federal government,12 the 
distinctions between various types of government secrets,13 the feasibility of 
7 Nero, 386 A.2d at 853. 
8 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706-08, 715 (1974). 
9 See generally N.J. CONST. 
10 See generally, e.g., THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSPARENCY IN POLITICS (Albert Breton, Gianluigi 
Galeotti, Pierre Salmon & Ronald Wintrobe, eds. 2016) (exploring the economic impacts of secrecy and 
transparency in government); 3 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF 
INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 3 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich, eds., Bedminster Press 1968) 
(exploring bureaucratic secrecy); Dennis F. Thompson, Democratic Secrecy, 114 POL. SCI. Q. 181 (1999) 
(exploring the problem of holding the government accountable without undermining its efficacy). 
11 The legal literature on government secrecy is voluminous: a recent Westlaw search shows 
approximately 2,000 law review articles with titles containing the word “secret.” 
12 See generally Margaret B. Kwoka, Leaking and Legitimacy, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1387 (2015) 
(describing a new “deluge” leak); David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government 
Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512 (2013) (outlining 
the ecology of government leaks and demonstrating the ways that various types of leaks advance the 
goals of government actors). 
13 See generally David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257 (2010) (outlining the 
distinctions between “deep” and “shallow” secrets in government). 
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controlling government information in the Internet age,14 and the legal 
exceptionalism of national security secrecy.15 The list goes on.16 
Yet legal scholars have paid less attention to government secrecy outside 
of the federal context. Even such basic questions as the types of information 
state and local governments keep secret, the legal underpinnings for state and 
local secrecy regimes, and the ecosystem surrounding government leaks at the 
state and local level have often been left unexplored.17 There is one notable 
exception: the topic of police secrecy, which has received more sustained 
attention from scholars.18 But even this subset of the literature is limited in 
certain respects. Scholars have largely focused on discrete issues within local 
law enforcement—for example, the availability of police disciplinary 
records19—or they have treated police transparency as one facet of the broader 
14 See generally Mark Fenster, The Implausibility of Secrecy, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 309 (2014) 
(cataloguing the ways that the government fails to control information). 
15 See Margaret B. Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy, 54 B.C. L. REV. 185, 212-16 (2013) (describing 
the unique procedures that shield national security information). 
16 Other topics include, for example, the relationship between statutory and constitutional 
rights of access, see generally Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms 
for Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV. 909 (2006), and the use of specific secrecy tools like the 
Glomar response, see generally Michael D. Becker, Comment, Piercing Glomar: Using the Freedom of 
Information Act and the Official Acknowledgment Doctrine to Keep Government Secrecy in Check, 64 
ADMIN. L. REV. 673 (2012). 
17 Scholars have addressed discrete issues relating to state and local secrecy. See, e.g., Megan 
Craig & Madeleine Davison, Secrecy in Death Records: A Call to Action, J. CIVIC INFO., Dec. 2020, at 
45, 47-50 (exploring secrecy in state death records); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and 
the Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L. REV. 515, 532-51 (2007) (reviewing the history of the reporter’s 
privilege in the states); Daxton “Chip” Stewart & Amy Kristin Sanders, Secrecy, Inc.: How 
Governments Use Trade Secrets, Purported Competitive Harm and Third-Party Interventions to Privatize 
Public Records, J. CIVIC INFO., Sept. 2019, at 1, 11-18 (exploring trade secrecy exemptions in the 
states). And scholar-practitioners and communications and journalism scholars have done excellent 
work exploring questions implicating transparency and secrecy in the states. See, e.g., Richard J. 
Peltz-Steele & Robert Steinbuch, Transparency Blind Spot: A Response to Transparency Deserts, 48 
RUTGERS L. REC. 1, 11-23 (2020) (listing publications that explore state freedom of information 
laws); see also RICHARD J. PELTZ-STEELE, THE LAW OF ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT 169-230 (2012) 
(exploring secrecy in state and federal law enforcement and corrections agencies); David Cuillier & 
Bruce E. Pinkleton, Suspicion and Secrecy: Political Attitudes and Their Relationship to Support for 
Freedom of Information, 16 COMMC’N L. & POL’Y 227 (2011) (exploring how public attitudes toward 
government transparency affect freedom of information policies). 
18 See, e.g., Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Exposing Secret Searches: A First Amendment Right of Access to 
Electronic Surveillance Orders, 93 WASH. L. REV. 145, 149-50 (2018) (arguing for a First Amendment 
right of access to law enforcement agencies’ electronic surveillance records); Barry Friedman, Secret 
Policing, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 99, 105-09 (arguing for greater public participation in the rules that 
govern police); Jonathan Manes, Secrecy & Evasion in Police Surveillance Technology, 34 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 503, 557-66 (2019) (arguing in favor of greater transparency and oversight of police 
surveillance technologies). 
19 See generally Kate Levine, Discipline and Policing, 68 DUKE L.J. 839 (2019) (arguing against 
the disclosure of police disciplinary records). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3946513
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question of how best to regulate law enforcement agencies.20 They have rarely 
expanded their scope of inquiry to make connections between secrecy in 
policing and secrecy in other realms of state and local government.21 
The obvious explanation for this oversight is that much of the existing 
secrecy scholarship focuses on national security secrecy.22 And state and local 
governments play a limited role in both generating and protecting this 
information.23 State and local secrecy, as a consequence, is often perceived as 
involving lower stakes. 
The reality is more complex. National security responsibilities do not 
always cleave neatly at jurisdictional borders.24 For example, local 
governments—and especially local police—have played a central intelligence-
gathering role in counterterrorism efforts in the wake of September 11.25 More 
importantly, there is a vast landscape of government secrecy that exists 
beyond the national security context, and even beyond the federal secrecy 
regime altogether. Each time a police department refuses a reporter’s request 
under the state public records law, a governor asserts executive privilege, or a 
state judge closes the courthouse doors, subfederal secrecy law is implicated. 
These state and local decisions matter. Federal secrets—and national 
security secrets, in particular—are often far removed from the everyday 
experiences of citizens.26 The actions of state and local government, in 
20 See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 
1848-49 (2015) (describing lack of police transparency as part of a broader argument for stronger ex 
ante rules governing policing). 
21 See infra note 34. 
22 See supra notes 12–16. There are two ways to define “national security secrets.” A formal 
approach would cabin the term to officially classified material. See Exec. Order No. 13,526 § 1.2(a), 
3 C.F.R. 298, 298-99 (2010) (describing classification levels). A functional approach would 
encompass information substantially related to the national defense or foreign affairs regardless of 
whether the information has been formally classified. See, e.g., Classified Information Procedures 
Act, Pub. L. 96-456, § 1(b), 94 Stat. 2025, 2025, reprinted in 18 U.S.C. app. at 414 (defining national 
security as “the national defense and foreign relations of the United States”). This Article largely 
employs a functional approach but uses the classification standards as a touchstone: it uses the phrase 
to refer both to information that has been formally classified and information that most likely would 
have been classified had it been generated by a federal rather than a state or local agency. For a 
critique of the hazy and often circular definitions of national security articulated by the government, 
see Laura K. Donohue, The Limits of National Security, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1573, 1579-84 (2011). 
23 See discussion infra Section I.C. 
24 See infra Section I.C. 
25 See K. JACK RILEY, GREGORY F. TREVERTON, JEREMY M. WILSON & LOIS M. DAVIS, 
STATE AND LOCAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM, at xi-xiii (2005) (describing 
local law enforcement agencies’ counterterrorism efforts); Matthew C. Waxman, National Security 
Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64 STAN. L. REV. 289, 306-10 (2012) (describing federal-subfederal 
intelligence cooperation after 9/11). 
26 See Pozen, supra note 12, at 574 (noting that the realm of national security is where “the 
executive’s activities [are] least visible to the average citizen”); see also Nestor M. Davidson, Localist 
Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564, 606 (2017) (noting that the federal government in general is 
more removed from the everyday lives of citizens). 
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contrast, tend to have an immediate and tangible impact on individuals’ daily 
lives.27 This is especially true in the law enforcement context, where robust 
informational protections can shield repeat offenders and systemic abuse.28 
For communities of color, and especially for Black communities, the stakes 
could not be higher.29 If we truly care about democratic governance and 
accountability at the state and local level, then we must grapple with the 
landscape of state and local government secrets. 
This Article charts the contours of this subfederal secrecy regime, using 
the framework of national security secrecy as a point of reference. It outlines 
the basic legal framework governing state and local secrets, exploring 
distinctions in secrecy regimes at the federal and subfederal levels. It then 
describes the relative scarcity of national security secrets in state and local 
government, and explores how this affects the legal underpinnings of the 
subfederal secrecy regime. Conversely, it highlights the types of secrets that 
state and local government officials are most concerned with safeguarding. 
This descriptive account sets the stage for this Article’s primary 
contribution. Once the lens of federal secrecy is applied to state and local 
government, the most significant feature of this subfederal regime comes into 
focus: the migration of powerful federal secrecy protections into state law. 
Specifically, secrecy protections developed to shield the national security state 
have migrated over time into state law and practice to protect a variety of state 
27 Davidson, supra note 26, at 570-72 (describing the breadth of local governments’ activities 
and responsibilities). 
28 See, e.g., Kendall Taggart & Mike Hayes, Secret NYPD Files: Officers Who Lie and Brutally 
Beat People Can Keep Their Jobs, BUZZFEED NEWS (Mar. 5, 2018, 5:58 AM), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/kendalltaggart/secret-nypd-files-hundreds-of-officers-
committed-serious [https://perma.cc/BFQ9-JS3J] (describing how leaked NYPD personnel records 
showed hundreds of officers had committed fireable offenses but were permitted to keep their jobs). 
29 See, e.g., Derek Hawkins, Officer Charged in George Floyd’s Death Used Fatal Force Before and 
Had History of Complaints, WASH. POST (May 29, 2020, 6:47 PM), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/05/29/officer-charged-george-floyds-death-used-fatal-force-
before-had-history-complaints [https://perma.cc/46KJ-UDNL] (describing barriers to accessing 
history of complaints against the police officer who killed George Floyd); Colleen Long, Investigator 
Who Leaked Chokehold Officer’s Records Resigns, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 23, 2017), 
https://apnews.com/article/ece63cd7ae5c4c248ba6dd75f1d59b90 [https://perma.cc/VK37-U8M8] 
(noting that the four substantiated complaints against the officer who killed Eric Garner were made 
public only after being leaked). I should emphasize, however, that transparency should not be 
equated with accountability. See Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 
892-94 (2006) (arguing that the promise of increased transparency does not guarantee a better 
informed, more responsive democracy). Improved access to information alone cannot address 
existing power imbalances embedded within the law. This is especially true in the context of policing. 
See Jocelyn Simonson, Police Reform Through a Power Lens, 130 YALE L.J. 778, 778 (2021) (arguing 
that true police reform requires shifting power from the police to the communities who are policed). 
But increased transparency in policing can, under certain conditions, serve as a useful initial step. 
See Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054, 2144-
45 (2017) (arguing that certain targeted transparency measures may help “democratiz[e]” policing).
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and local government entities. State judges have applied presidential executive 
privilege protections to the records of state governors; local police departments 
have reproduced records’ classifications systems meant to protect national 
security secrets; and state legislators have carved out holes in the state public 
records laws to shield law enforcement agencies from public oversight. 
I refer to this process as “secrecy creep.”30 And I argue that we should be 
wary of this trend. The adoption of these powerful secrecy protections creates 
discordance in the law: the textual, structural, and historical underpinnings 
of the federal secrecy regime are distinct from the subfederal regime, and 
these national security protections often sit uneasily within the state legal 
framework.31 Further, the distinct structure and nature of state and local 
government exacerbates the negative consequences of excessive government 
secrecy, imposing unique harms that do not necessarily surface in the federal 
context. State and local governments are not monitored by the same internal 
and external systems of checks and balances, and these secrecy tools allow 
state and local officials to aggregate power while shielded from public view.32 
Illuminating these hidden channels allows state judges and legislators to take 
steps to curb the more harmful effects of this trend. 
Describing the problem of secrecy creep has further implications. In 
recent years, there has been a national debate over the growing militarization 
of police, or the large-scale transfer of military weapons and equipment to 
local law enforcement agencies.33 This excavation of state and local secrecy 
surfaces a parallel development in the law. It shows that just as physical 
weapons developed for battlefields have been imported into American cities 
and towns, powerful informational protections developed in the national 
security context have begun to spill over into state and local law. I refer to 
this as the “national security-ization” of local police. 
Exploring this process adds a new dimension to contemporary 
discussions of police power and constraints.34 It tethers the police’s 
30 For further explanation of this phrase, see infra note 156. 
31 See discussion infra subsection III.B.1. 
32 See discussion infra subsection III.B.2. 
33 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Senate Subcomm. on Fin. & Contracting Oversight, One-Third 
of ‘Excess’ Military Equipment Sent to Local Police Departments Was New (Sept. 9, 2014), 
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/fco/media/one-third-of-excess-military-equipment-
sent-to-local_police-departments-was-new-mccaskill-hearing-reveals [https://perma.cc/4PFQ-
CJVE] (“Local police departments in 49 of 50 states have more Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected 
vehicles (MRAPs) than their state’s National Guard units.”); Philip V. McHarris, Why Does the 
Minneapolis Police Department Look Like a Military Unit?, WASH. POST (May 28, 2020, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/05/28/explaining-militarized-police-response-
protesters-after-killing-george-floyd [https://perma.cc/MV34-K3HD] (“Police departments have 
come to resemble military units . . . .”). 
34 While the police militarization, secrecy, and surveillance scholarship has remained somewhat 
siloed, a handful of scholars have examined the connections between police militarization, surveillance, 
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augmented physical capabilities—in terms of both weapons and surveillance 
equipment—to its expanded authority to keep its activities secret. And it 
demonstrates that the ramping up of police weaponry alongside police 
secrecy is not coincidental. Rather, these two processes are engaged in a 
feedback loop: the more that local police rely on military weapons and 
federal surveillance technologies, the more persuasive their arguments for 
borrowing national security secrecy protections become. 
Finally, it illuminates a new channel of legal migration. National security 
scholars have examined the movement of legal ideas into and out of the national 
security sphere.35 In the wake of September 11, in particular, they have explored 
the ways that rapid changes in national security law have affected other legal 
realms.36 But much of this scholarship explores the ratcheting down of due 
process protections as they cross into and out of the national security context.37 
This Article, in contrast, describes the ratcheting up of secrecy protections as 
they cross out of the national security sphere and into state law. 
One final caveat: I do not exhaustively chronicle secrecy in federal, state, 
and local government. Rather, I focus attention on a smaller subset of secrets: 
national security secrets in the federal context, and executive branch secrecy 
in state and local government.38 The topic of government secrecy is vast: 
virtually every government action arguably implicates transparency or 
secrecy in some way. Homing in on national security secrets in the federal 
government, and the extent to which the absence of a national security 
and secrecy more broadly. See, e.g., Manes, supra note 18, at 514-19 (noting federal secrecy requirements 
that link police adoption of federal surveillance tools to increased police secrecy). 
35 See, e.g., Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be 
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1097 (2003) (“[T]here is a strong probability that measures used 
by the government in emergencies will eventually seep into the legal system even after the crisis has 
ended.”); Shirin Sinnar, Essay, Rule of Law Tropes in National Security, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1566, 1569 
(2016) (describing the adoption of “rule of law” concepts into the national security context). This 
scholarship is part of a much larger body of works examining the concept and process of legal 
migration. See, e.g., G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 180-82 (1998) 
(describing state courts’ interpretation of state constitutional rights provisions in “lockstep” with 
analogous federal provisions); Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. 
L. REV. 459, 460 (2010) (examining the ways that constitutional concepts and doctrines from one
substantive area cross over into another).
36 See, e.g., LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE COST OF COUNTERTERRORISM 2 (2008) (describing 
how expanded executive authority in the wake of terrorist attacks often ends up being applied in 
other contexts). 
37 See, e.g., Sinnar, supra note 35, at 1611-12 (describing the risk that watered-down rule of law 
concepts “affect interpretation[s] of the original standards”); Stephen I. Vladeck, Terrorism Trials 
and the Article III Courts After Abu Ali, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1501, 1501 (2010) (describing the concern 
that trying terrorism suspects in Article III courts would “sanction exceptional departures from 
procedural or evidentiary norms that will eventually become settled as the rule”). 
38 I define “executive branch” secrecy at the local level broadly to include most functions of the 
local government, including local law enforcement. See Davidson, supra note 26, at 571-72 (describing 
the blurring of lines between branches at the local level). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3946513
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apparatus affects the secrecy regime at the state and local level, renders this 
subject more manageable.39 Further, much of the existing literature on federal 
secrecy explores secrecy in the national security state, and the framework this 
scholarship erects serves as a natural starting point for comparison. Using the 
lens of national security secrecy to explore subfederal secrets therefore makes 
sense from an analytic perspective as well.40 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I offers a high-level overview of 
government secrecy at the federal, state, and local level. It focuses attention 
first on federal secrets—and more specifically, on the creation and protection 
of national security secrets. It then addresses secrecy in state and local 
government: it outlines the legal regime that governs state and local secrets, 
explores the types of secrets that state and local officials are most concerned 
with protecting, and examines the role of state and local actors in generating 
and shielding national security secrets. Part II then describes the problem of 
secrecy creep, chronicling the various informational protections developed to 
shield national security secrets that have since been adopted by state judicial, 
legislative, and executive branches. Finally, Part III explores the implications 
of this process. It describes the benefits and harms of secrecy creep and offers 
potential solutions, suggesting ways that we might better regulate the 
adoption of federal secrecy tools by state and local actors. 
I. GOVERNMENT SECRETS
The topic of secrecy in government is vast: any government requirement 
that restricts or disseminates information arguably falls within its scope. 
References in the legal literature to “government secrecy,” however, tend to 
39 I confine this Article to the topic of government secrecy without interrogating the broader 
transparency law backdrop against which this secrecy occurs, nor engaging with the many scholarly 
critiques of this body of law. Such an inquiry is beyond the scope of the present project. I will briefly 
note, however, that some of these broader critiques of transparency law writ large apply differently 
in the state and local context. For example, David Pozen has criticized the federal transparency law 
regime for overexposing much of the executive branch while underexposing the national security 
agencies. See David E. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100, 154-56 (2018). The 
example of secrecy creep suggests that local law enforcement agencies, like the national security 
agencies, are likewise underwatched. Yet it is less clear that these myriad other, non-law enforcement 
state and local agencies suffer from overattention. Indeed, in a previous work, I have suggested that 
this may be less of a concern at the subfederal level. See Christina Koningisor, Transparency Deserts, 
114 NW. U. L. REV. 1461, 1496-98, 1537-38 (2020). 
40 I do not address these tools on their merits: scholars have previously critiqued the use of 
these secrecy protections in the national security context, where they originated, and I do not repeat 
this work. See generally Becker, supra note 16 (criticizing the use of Glomar to deny requests for 
information); David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of 
Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628 (2005) (criticizing use of the mosaic theory). 
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refer to a narrower slice of secrecy—usually executive branch secrecy,41 often 
with an emphasis on national security information. This Part at first follows 
this mold, providing an overview of federal secrecy that is largely concerned 
with the infrastructure of national security secrets. It then departs from this 
model by exploring the nature and structure of secrecy in state and local 
government, which is largely oriented around non-national security 
information. In doing so, it sets the stage for further exploration of how the 
federal secrecy regime has influenced—and arguably distorted—secrecy in 
state and local government. 
A. Federal Secrets
A wealth of scholarship addresses the nature and scope of the federal 
secrecy regime.42 This Section briefly summarizes that work, both to provide 
a point of reference for later discussions of states’ secrets and to introduce the 
national security secrecy protections that have recently migrated into state 
and local law. The goal of this Section is not to provide a comprehensive 
account of secrecy in federal government, but rather to offer context for a 
subsequent exploration of the process of secrecy creep. 
1. Constitutional Secrecy
The U.S. Constitution mentions the word “secrecy” just once: Article I, 
Section 5 requires that the House of Representatives keep and publish a journal 
of its proceedings “excepting such Parts as in their Judgment may require 
Secrecy.”43 Although this is the only explicit reference to government secrecy 
contained in the text, the Constitution separately describes circumstances under 
which secrecy is prohibited. Article II, Section 3 requires that the President 
periodically inform Congress about the state of the union,44 for example, and 
the Sixth Amendment requires a public trial in criminal proceedings.45 
Despite the scarcity of clear textual commands involving government 
secrecy—or its inverse, government transparency—structural features of the 
Constitution are often invoked to justify both greater and lesser protection 
for government secrets. In the context of the executive branch, for example, 
constitutional separation of powers principles have formed the basis of the 
41 See, e.g., Pozen, supra note 13, at 276 (restricting analysis to “secrets used in the formulation 
or administration of executive branch public policy”); Fenster, supra note 14, at 317 (describing the 
formal and informal laws and norms that enable executive branch secrecy). 
42 See, e.g., supra notes 12–16. 
43 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3. 
44 Id. art II, § 3. 
45 Id. amend. VI. 
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President’s executive privilege.46 Yet these structural arguments support the 
transparency side of the ledger as well. The Constitution is designed to 
compel the separate branches of government to communicate with one 
another to function effectively—to enact legislation,47 appoint judicial 
nominees,48 or ratify treaties.49 
Constitutional history sheds little additional light on the permissible 
scope of executive branch secrecy. Certain features of the constitutional 
drafting process are relevant: the Constitutional Convention, for example, 
took place in secret.50 The Supreme Court has invoked this fact to support its 
construction of the executive privilege.51 But to the extent that the drafters 
discussed secrecy in government at all, they tended to make only passing 
reference to the types of information that we would consider national security 
secrets today, such as military intelligence52 or the negotiations preceding a 
treaty.53 At the same time, they were also wary of excessive secrecy, warning 
of the perils of an unwatched and unmonitored government.54 In sum, for 
nearly every constitutional argument there is in support of federal secrecy—
textual, structural, or historical—there is also a counterargument in support 
of transparency in government. 
2. Statutory Secrecy
Perhaps the most visible way that the federal government shields its 
national security secrets is through “a complex and often overlapping” 
patchwork of federal statutes that criminalize the unauthorized disclosure of 
classified information.55 Foremost among these laws is the 1917 Espionage 
46 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974) (“The [executive] privilege is 
fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers 
under the Constitution.”). 
47 U.S. CONST. art. I § 7. 
48 Id. art. II § 2, cl. 2. 
49 Id.; see also Pozen, supra note 13, at 300 (“The quintessential structural feature of the Constitution, 
the distribution of powers across the coordinate branches, serves as an information-forcing device.”). 
50 Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705 n.15. 
51 Id. 
52 See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to Patrick Henry (Feb. 24, 1777), in THE PAPERS 
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 437 (Dorothy, Twohig, Philander D. Chase, Beverly H. Runge, Frank 
E. Grizzard, Jr., Mark A. Mastromarino, Elizabeth B. Mercer & Jack D. Warren eds., 1985)
(describing the importance of military secrecy).
53 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 64 (John Jay) (describing the importance of secrecy in 
treaty negotiations). 
54 See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in IX THE WRITINGS OF 
JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) (“A popular Government, without popular information, 
or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both.”). 
55 STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN & JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41404, CRIMINAL 
PROHIBITIONS ON LEAKS AND OTHER DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED DEFENSE INFORMATION 1 (2017). 
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Act.56 Enacted upon the eve of the United States’ entrance into the First 
World War, the statute criminalizes the improper sharing of information 
“connected with the national defense.”57 A variety of other statutes separately 
criminalize the unauthorized disclosure of classified or sensitive information. 
They prohibit government employees from disclosing classified 
information,58 for example, or criminalize the dissemination of certain types 
of information, such as the identities of covert agents.59 
A second group of federal “secrecy” statutes govern the dissemination of 
government information more broadly.60 The most prominent of these is the 
Freedom of Information Act.61 The structure of this law is most likely familiar 
to readers. In broad strokes, it creates a presumption of public access to 
government records but carves out nine specific categories of records to be 
withheld from public view. The most significant of these exemptions offer 
protections for classified documents, inter-agency and other privileged 
communications, documents containing private information, trade secrets, 
and law enforcement records.62 The statutes that regulate classified material 
largely affect federal employees; it is through FOIA, in contrast, that the 
average citizen is most likely to interact with the federal secrecy regime. 
3. Executive Secrecy
The President has a variety of tools at his disposal to shield information from 
public view.63 But these powers are at their apex in the national security context. 
The Supreme Court has held that the President enjoys near-plenary control over 
national security information, reasoning that the chief executive’s 
responsibilities as commander in chief of the military vests him or her with 
inherent authority to control national security information, apart from any 
explicit constitutional grant.64 Further, the President enjoys exclusive authority 
to enact the procedures by which the classification process is governed.65 
56 Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-798). 
57 Id. § 793(c). 
58 18 U.S.C. § 1924. 
59 50 U.S.C. §§ 3121-26. 
60 See, e.g., The Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a); 
The Government in Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 5 and 39 U.S.C.). 
61 5 U.S.C. § 552; see also Pozen, supra note 39, at 118 (describing FOIA as the “canonical piece 
of transparency legislation”). 
62 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(7). 
63 See, e.g., id. § 552(b) (outlining FOIA exemptions). 
64 Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1987). 
65 See Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Jan. 5, 2010) (proscribing a new “uniform 
system” for classifying national security information). 
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Trillions of pages of government records are now classified and excluded 
from public view.66 Legislators, scholars, and even executive branch officials 
have called attention in recent years to the problem of over-classification. 
They have noted that the executive branch has every motivation to shield 
documents from public view, but little incentive to limit or reverse the 
classification process.67 As a consequence, there has been a staggering growth 
in federal secrecy in recent decades, especially in the wake of 9/11.68 Huge 
sections of the executive branch are now walled off from public view, 
including much of the national security state.69 
A second, less formalized way that the executive branch exerts control over 
national security secrets is by exercising prosecutorial discretion over whether 
and when to pursue leaks of classified information. Such leaks occur daily in 
Washington, and yet the prosecution of leakers is still exceedingly rare: one 
scholar has put the percentage of indictments of leakers at “close[] to zero.”70 
The handful of prosecutions that do move forward, however, tend to have far-
reaching effects. They serve to remind government officials of the stiff penalties 
they face for releasing sensitive or classified information to the public, and they 
send a message about the types of secrets the administration has prioritized.71 
4. Judicial Secrecy
The federal judiciary both creates and abides by a separate set of 
institutional rules intended to protect government secrets. It reviews 
classified documents in camera,72 for example, or permits ex parte filings 
when national security information is implicated.73 Further, a wholly separate 
66 PUB. INT. DECLASSIFICATION BD., TRANSFORMING THE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
SYSTEM 5 (2012), https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/pidb/recommendations/ 
transforming-classification.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KBL-RD97]. 
67 See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION 
REPORT 417 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT], https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ 
911/report/911Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/UTB9-U2T3] (“No one has to pay the long-term costs of 
overclassifying information, though these costs—even in literal financial terms—are substantial.”),  
68 See Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in Preventing Unnecessary 
Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 133 (2006) (describing the growth in secrecy post-9/11). 
69 See Fenster, supra note 29, at 922-23 (describing how overclassification hinders FOIA); David E. 
Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1118-23 (2017) 
(noting the extent to which national security information is shielded under FOIA). 
70 Pozen, supra note 12, at 536. 
71 See Heidi Kitrosser, Leak Prosecutions and the First Amendment: New Developments and A Closer 
Look at the Feasibility of Protecting Leakers, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1221, 1257-58 (2015) (discussing 
the significant impact of the few prosecutions that are ultimately undertaken against classified 
information leakers). 
72 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (permitting in camera review). 
73 See, e.g., Jifry v. FAA, 370 F.3d 1174, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he court has inherent 
authority to review classified material ex parte, in camera as part of its judicial review function.”). 
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judicial apparatus oversees and regulates the gathering of foreign intelligence 
information.74 In this way, the judiciary works to ensure that the legal process 
itself will not unleash national security secrets. 
Separately, federal courts have interpreted the law in ways that facilitate 
the executive branch’s ability to both generate and protect national security 
secrets. There are myriad examples of such judicially-created tools of 
executive secrecy. But especially relevant to the subfederal context are the 
various evidentiary privileges the federal judiciary has granted to the chief 
executive.75 Three subsets of this privilege, in particular, have implications for 
the subfederal secrecy regime: the federal state secrets privilege, the 
presidential communications privilege, and the deliberative process privilege. 
The first of these, the federal state secrets privilege, is the most 
straightforward. It permits the President and high-ranking executive officials 
to shield information when there is a reasonable danger that disclosure would 
harm national security. Its protection is absolute.76 The presidential 
communications privilege, in contrast, is a qualified one that shields the chief 
executive’s communications with close advisors.77 First articulated in United 
States v. Nixon, the privilege gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of 
protection, placing the burden on the opposing party to overcome this 
presumption with a demonstration of need.78 
The final executive privilege, the deliberative process privilege, is also 
qualified. It permits the executive branch to withhold predecisional, advisory 
records from public view.79 It sweeps more broadly than the other two 
privileges, shielding not only the records of the President and his top 
advisors, but also those held by agency officials throughout the executive 
branch.80 Yet it is also a weaker privilege, more difficult to secure than the 
presidential communications privilege, and more easily overcome.81 Together, 
74 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1803. 
75 See Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited, 92 IOWA L. 
REV. 489, 491 (2007) (noting that executive secrecy is “most visible and most notorious when [it] 
take[s] the form of an executive privilege claim”). 
76 See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953) (recognizing absolute privilege for state 
secrets). The federal state secrets privilege is sometimes referred to as a subset of the executive privilege 
and sometimes as a wholly separate privilege held by the executive branch. Compare, e.g., Black v. 
Sheraton Corp. of Am., 564 F.2d 531, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (referring to the state secrets privilege as a 
type of executive privilege), with Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395, 398 n.2 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (referring to the executive privilege as distinct from the state secrets privilege). 
77 See generally United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
78 Id. at 708, 713-15. 
79 See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“The deliberative process privilege 
is a qualified privilege and can be overcome by a sufficient showing of need.”). 
80 Id. This is the privilege enshrined in Exemption 5 of FOIA. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). 
81 See Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep’t of Army, 55 F.3d 827, 854 (3d Cir. 1995) (“The 
privilege, once determined to be applicable, is not absolute.”). 
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these three privileges grant the President ample authority to shield 
information from public view. 
The federal judiciary has enabled executive branch secrecy in other ways 
as well. One striking example is the federal courts’ narrow interpretations of 
FOIA. Congress attempted to limit the executive branch’s authority to shield 
information with the enactment of the federal statute, and yet the courts have 
consistently construed this statute in ways that advance, rather than impede, 
secrecy in government.82 The judicially-created “Glomar response,” for 
example, permits the federal agencies to refuse to acknowledge the mere 
existence of requested records.83 The federal courts also grant an unusual level 
of deference to agencies’ national security determinations in FOIA cases.84 
Taken together, these various doctrines and decisions substantially enhance 
the federal secrecy regime. 
B. States’ Secrets
The scarcity of national security secrets in the state and local context 
alters the landscape of the subfederal secrecy regime. This Section examines 
what secrecy looks like in state and local government, setting the stage for a 
later exploration of the ways that the federal secrecy architecture—which is 
largely oriented around the protection of national security secrets—has bled 
into state and local law in recent decades. 
The full landscape of subfederal secrecy is as vast and unchartable as that 
of the federal regime. Any intentional withholding of information by state 
and local government arguably qualifies. To render this topic more 
manageable, I use national security secrecy as a touchstone. I do not 
exhaustively catalogue the various sources of subfederal secrecy, but rather 
explore points of divergence from the federal regime—taking the federal 
discussion of national security secrecy as a roadmap, and then following this 
same terrain through state and local law and practice. 
1. Constitutional Secrecy
Like the federal Constitution, the fifty state constitutions contain 
surprisingly few explicit references to secrecy in government. Many state 
82 See generally Kwoka, supra note 15. 
83 Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Mil. Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 
724, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
84 Kwoka, supra note 15, at 187; see, e.g., Maynard v. CIA, 986 F.2d 547, 555 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[I]n 
determining whether withheld material relates to intelligence sources or methods, the court must accord 
substantial weight and due consideration to [the agency].” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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constitutions require that elections be conducted via secret ballot,85 for 
example, or permit legislative proceedings to be closed to the public “when 
secrecy is required.”86 Overall, however, few state constitutions address 
government secrecy in any meaningful way.87 The same holds true for 
transparency in government. Most states enumerate certain circumstances 
under which openness is constitutionally mandated—they require a list of 
public expenditures be disclosed periodically,88 for instance, or provide 
instructions for publicizing constitutional amendments.89 But rarely do these 
constitutional provisions go further.90 
Every state constitution divides power among the three branches of 
government,91 and, in theory, many of the structural arguments made for or 
against secrecy in government could apply at the state level as well. Yet 
distinctions do exist.92 For one, many state constitutions enshrine separation 
of powers explicitly within the text,93 and state judges have debated whether 
these provisions suggest a more rigid separation between the branches than 
exists at the federal level.94 Further, while the structure of state government 
may nominally imitate that of the federal government, there are marked 
distinctions in how these branches operate. Differences in how state 
legislatures are constituted can hinder the development of a fully 
85 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. V, § 3 (“Secrecy of voting shall be preserved.”); ARIZ. CONST. 
art. 7, § 1 (same). 
86 ARK. CONST. art. V, § 13; see also COLO. CONST. art. V, § 14 (“The sessions of each house 
. . . shall be open, unless when the business is such as ought to be kept secret.”). 
87 There are exceptions: the North Carolina Constitution, for example, still contains a 
Reconstruction-era prohibition on “secret political societies.” N.C. CONST. art. I, § 12; see also 
Dillard S. Gardner, The Continuous Revision of Our State Constitution, 36 N.C. L. REV. 297, 300 (1958) 
(noting that this provision was enacted in 1875). 
88 See, e.g., IOWA CONST. art. 3.02, § 18 (“An accurate statement of the receipts and 
expenditures of the public money shall be attached to and published with the laws, at every regular 
session of the general assembly.”). 
89 See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. V, § 24 (“No law shall be revived, or amended, or the provisions 
thereof extended or conferred by reference to its title only, but so much thereof as is revived, 
amended, extended or conferred, shall be re-enacted and published at length.”). 
90 One exception is Florida, which contains an express constitutional right of access to 
government information. FLA. CONST. art 1, § 24. 
91 Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederal Separation of Powers Ideals 
in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1190-91 (1999). 
92 See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 238-39 
(2009) (noting that each state has its own distinct distribution of powers). 
93 See Rossi, supra note 91, at 1191 (noting that 35 state constitutions contain this clause). 
94 Compare, e.g., Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 924-25 (Fla. 1978) (relying on 
separation of powers provision to uphold nondelegation doctrine), with Brown v. Heymann, 297 
A.2d 572, 576-77 (N.J. 1972) (declining to construct separation of powers more rigidly based on an
explicit constitutional provision).
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professionalized legislative branch, for instance, magnifying the power of the 
state executive branch relative to the state legislature.95 
There are historical distinctions as well. In contrast with the U.S. 
Constitution, many states’ constitutions were drafted in public view.96 
Moreover, many state constitutions have been repeatedly amended or even 
replaced altogether, making the task of ferreting out the views and intentions 
of the “framers” far more difficult.97 As a consequence, state judges tend not 
to look as rigorously at original intent as an interpretive method.98 Such 
historical distinctions can alter the way that state judges resolve questions of 
secrecy in government as well. 
2. Statutory Secrecy
There are no state statutes comparable to those restricting the disclosure 
of classified information at the federal level, since there is no formal 
classification system in the states. Arguably the closest analogue is the 
assortment of state statutes that prohibit information disclosures in the 
criminal law context, such as those that require secrecy in grand jury 
proceedings.99 Overall, however, the statutory regime governing information 
disclosures in state and local government is both less coherent and less 
punitive than that which governs national security information.100 
There is greater overlap in federal and state law when it comes to public 
records statutes. Every state has a public records law providing a private right 
of access to government information, and the structure of these statutes 
broadly resemble that of FOIA: government information is presumptively 
accessible to the public, with certain enumerated exemptions.101 One key 
95 See JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 168-69 (2005) 
(“Congress’s high degree of professionalization and busy calendar make it a far more potent 
generator of legislative initiatives than its unprofessionalized, part-time state counterparts . . . .”). 
There are distinctions embedded in the constitutional text as well. See G. Alan Tarr, Interpreting the 
Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 329, 339 (2003) (providing 
examples of these textual differences). 
96 See discussion infra notes 340–41. 
97 GARDNER, supra note 95, at 27-29. 
98 Id. at 11 (noting state courts’ “general unwillingness to address the intentions of the drafters 
and ratifiers of the state constitution”). 
99 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.70 (McKinney 2020) (criminalizing the intentional 
disclosure of grand jury information without authorization); MO. ANN. STAT. § 540.120 (West 
2020) (violating grand jury oath of secrecy is a Class B misdemeanor). Statutes requiring 
confidentiality in police records are also somewhat analogous. See generally Rachel Moran, Police 
Privacy, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 153, 158 (2019). 
100 See generally MULLIGAN & ELSEA, supra note 55, at 1 (describing the legal regime governing 
the unauthorized disclosure of classified information). 
101 See Koningisor, Deserts, supra note 39, at 1475-79 (providing an overview of state public 
records laws). 
2021] Secrecy Creep 1769 
distinction, however, is how central these laws are to the broader government 
secrecy regime. At the federal level, secrecy conflicts are often concentrated 
around leaks of classified information.102 At the state level, in contrast, these 
public records laws tend to serve as the locus for government secrecy 
disputes.103 As a consequence, these statutes play an outsized role in holding 
the government accountable to the public.104 
3. Executive Secrecy
There is no classification system at the state level. To the extent that state 
executive branch officials shield government information, they tend to do so 
by exercising discretionary tools made available to them by the judicial and 
legislative branches: state agencies withhold records under a public records 
act exemption,105 for example, or police officers withhold investigatory 
records pursuant to a common law privilege.106 
The absence of classified information alters the nature of “leaks” 
investigations at the state and local level as well. Today, this term usually 
refers to efforts to identify the source of classified information that has been 
disclosed without authorization.107 Yet historically, these types of national 
security leak investigations were fairly rare. For centuries, such inquiries were 
more typically focused on identifying the sources of confidential information 
about criminal proceedings in state and local court.108 Such efforts continue 
at the state and local level today,109 in the context of both unauthorized 
disclosures of grand jury information and leaks of law enforcement 
102 See generally Pozen, supra note 12, at 513. 
103 See, e.g., Nero v. Hyland, 386 A.2d 846, 848-49 (N.J. 1978) (involving a dispute over a public 
records claim); Killington, Ltd. v. Lash, 572 A.2d 1368, 1370-71 (Vt. 1990) (same). 
104 See Koningisor, Deserts, supra note 39, at 1536-42 (defending the importance of public 
records statutes to public oversight at the state and local level). 
105 See, e.g., id. at 1506 (“Florida law, for example, contains 1,000 exemptions to public 
disclosure.”). 
106 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Daniels, 607 N.E.2d 1255, 1266 (Ill. 1992) (recognizing law 
enforcement investigatory privilege); Reinstein v. Police Comm’r of Bos., 391 N.E.2d 881, 886 
(Mass. 1979) (same). 
107 See Pozen, supra note 12, at 513 (exploring the ecosystem of federal leaks). 
108 See Christina Koningisor, The De Facto Reporter’s Privilege, 127 YALE L.J. 1176, 1215, 1219, 
1221, 1228, 1230 (2018) [hereinafter Koningisor, Privilege] (describing these investigations). 
109 See, e.g., People v. McKee, 24 N.E.3d 75, 79 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (reversing lower court 
decision to compel reporter to reveal his source of leaked grand jury materials). 
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investigatory materials.110 Yet these investigations do not garner the level of 
public attention that national security leaks investigations now receive.111 
Of course, governors and mayors—like the President—must routinely 
contend with information leaks to the press, from drafts of state budgets to the 
contents of emails.112 Yet broader structural impediments blunt the impact of 
state and local government leaks. Arguably, the most important of these 
developments is the collapse of local media, which has made it less likely that 
information about state and local government will make its way into the press.113 
As a consequence, leaks seem to play a lesser role in the information ecosystem 
surrounding state and local government than they do in the federal context. 
4. Judicial Secrecy
State judges likewise have a variety of tools at their disposal to shield 
information from public view. It is no accident that the judiciary is described 
as the “most secretive” branch.114 Yet this Section confines itself to much the 
same terrain as the previous discussion of federal judicial secrecy, 
concentrating on sources of subfederal secrecy that are in some way adjacent 
to the national security secrecy regime. This allows for a more targeted 
inquiry into two types of judicial secrets that are especially central to the 
process of secrecy creep: executive privilege in the states, and state court 
interpretations of public records laws. 
State courts have diverged in their approach to gubernatorial privilege 
claims. Many have recognized a state common law deliberative process 
privilege analogous to the federal one.115 This makes sense: the same common 
law history supports the protection of predecisional records at both the state 
and federal level, and policy concerns about the chilling of government speech 
110 See, e.g., In re Search of Verizon Wireless, State of California, City and County of San 
Francisco (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.rcfp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Bryan-Carmody-
Search-Warrant-RCFP.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7QJ-5R9P] (categorizing the leak of a police report 
as a criminal theft violation under Cal. Penal Code § 484(a)). 
111 Cf. Koningisor, Privilege, supra note 108, at 1204 n.153 (noting that the N.Y. Times ran sixty-
four stories and letters when one of its reporters was jailed for refusing to name a source). 
112 See, e.g., Carl Golden, Opinion, I Was Press Secretary for 2 N.J. Governors: Trump Will Fail in 
Crusade Against Leaks, N.J. STAR LEDGER (Feb. 28, 2017, 11:40 AM), https://www.nj.com/ 
opinion/2017/02/i_was_press_secretary_for_2_nj_governors_trump_wil.html 
[https://perma.cc/3DKF-YAFV] (“[Governors] deal[] with leaks and their fallout almost daily.”). 
113 See discussion infra subsection III.B.2. 
114 Joel Cohen, An Interview with Judge Richard A. Posner, ABA J., July 2014, at 53, 56. 
115 See, e.g., Gwich’in Steering Comm. v. State of Ala., Off. of the Governor, 10 P.3d 572, 579 
(Ala. 2000) (recognizing common law deliberative process privilege); City of Colo. Springs v. 
White, 967 P.2d 1042, 1049-50 (Colo. 1998) (same); Ostoin v. Waterford Twp. Police Dep’t, 471 
N.W.2d 666, 668 (Mich. 1991) (same). 
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apply in both contexts.116 The federal state secrets privilege, in contrast, has 
surfaced only rarely at the state level. The federal courts have emphasized 
that the privilege is “not to be lightly invoked,”117 available only where there 
is “a palpable threat to national security.”118 Unsurprisingly, state judges tend 
to look unfavorably on these claims. I could find no examples of a state court 
extending an absolute privilege to shield government secrets. Few state or 
local officials have even tried.119 
In other words, the deliberative process privilege is sufficiently removed 
from the national security realm to make its application in the state context 
fairly uncontroversial. The federal state secrets privilege, in contrast, is so 
closely tethered to national security concerns that its inapplicability to state 
and local government secrets is likewise undisputed. That leaves the 
confidential communications privilege, often referred to at the state level as 
the gubernatorial communications privilege. This is the most contested of the 
three.120 It is also the privilege that is most vulnerable to secrecy creep. 
State courts have diverged in their treatment of gubernatorial privilege 
claims.121 In the wake of Nixon, a handful of courts adopted an equivalent 
gubernatorial communications privilege.122 But most of these early cases 
recognized some amalgamation of the different strands of executive privilege. 
They tended to blur the lines of these evidentiary shields and use the phrase 
“executive privilege” interchangeably to refer to different types of 
116 See, e.g., White, 967 P.2d at 1047 (describing the privilege’s origins in British law). But see 
Babets v. Sec’y of Exec. Off. of Hum. Servs., 526 N.E.2d 1261, 1263 (Mass. 1988) (declining to 
recognize deliberative process privilege). 
117 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953). 
118 U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 409, 413 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1984). 
119 See, e.g., Rubin v. City of Los Angeles, 190 Cal. App. 3d 560, 577 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) 
(rejecting Los Angeles’s claim to the state secrets privilege articulated in Reynolds, reasoning that 
only the federal government may invoke this privilege). 
120 Many decisions recognizing a privilege have been handed down over strong dissents. See, 
e.g., State ex rel. Dann v. Taft, 848 N.E.2d 472, 489 (Ohio 2006) (Pfeifer, J., dissenting); Freedom 
Found. v. Gregoire, 310 P.3d 1252, 1267 (Wash. 2013) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
121 Roughly ten states have addressed the existence of the executive communications in the 
gubernatorial context. Four have adopted the privilege into state law. See Taft, 848 N.E.2d at 474; 
Freedom Found., 310 P.3d at 1256); Doe v. Ala. Superior Ct., Third Jud. Dist., 721 P.2d 617, 625 (Ala. 
1986); Nero v. Hyland, 386 A.2d 846, 853 (N.J. 1978). Four have recognized some amalgamation of 
the executive communications privilege and the deliberative process privilege. See Guy v. Judicial 
Nominating Comm’n, 659 A.2d 777, 785 (Del. Super. Ct. 1995); Hamilton v. Verdow, 414 A.2d 914, 
925 (Md. 1980); Killington, Ltd. v. Lash, 572 A.2d 1368, 1374 (Vt. 1990); Vandelay Ent., LLC v. 
Fallin, 343 P.3d 1273, 1278-79 (Okla. 2014). One has recognized a privilege modeled on Nixon, but 
amended its scope. Republican Party of N.M. v. N.M. Tax’n & Revenue Dep’t, 283 P.3d 853, 866 
(N.M. 2012). And one has rejected the privilege outright. Babets, 526 N.E.2d at 1263. 
122 See, e.g., Doe, 721 P.2d at 622-23 (recognizing a constitutionally-based privilege modeled on 
Nixon); Nero, 386 A.2d at 853 (same). 
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informational protections.123 It is only more recently that courts have begun 
to cleanly distinguish between the constitutional and common law 
privileges.124 This has set the stage for a clearer-eyed treatment of Nixon and 
its applicability to gubernatorial records. 
Only a handful of states have squarely addressed this question. But two 
of them—Ohio and Washington—have essentially adopted the Court’s 
reasoning in Nixon into state law.125 Both state supreme courts have 
recognized a constitutional privilege explicitly modeled on the presidential 
communications privilege, one that creates a presumptive shield for 
gubernatorial communications and places the burden on the party seeking 
disclosure to demonstrate need.126 Further, both decisions rely heavily on 
analogues between the constitutional role of the governor in state government 
and that of the president in the federal context.127 Both were also handed 
down over strong dissents.128 
Evidentiary privileges are not the only place where state courts have 
followed the lead of the federal judiciary. State judges have also adopted the 
doctrines and practices developed by federal judges to curtail the 
transparency effects of FOIA. States have expressly permitted state and local 
agencies to issue a Glomar response,129 for example, or borrowed the federal 
courts’ deferential approach to government claims of harm.130 As in the 
federal context, these written and unwritten doctrines and practices have 
helped to expand the subfederal secrecy regime. 
C. Federal Secrets in the States
A potential counterargument to this Article’s critique of secrecy creep is 
that state and local governments are inextricably intertwined with the 
national security state. Disentangling national security concerns from state 
123 See, e.g., Guy, 659 A.2d at 785 (mixing elements of both the deliberative process and confidential 
communications privileges); Verdow, 414 A.2d at 925 (same); Killington, 572 A.2d at 1374 (same). 
124 In 1997, the D.C. Circuit issued an opinion clearly setting forth the distinctions in both 
origin and substance of the deliberative process and presidential communications privilege. See In 
re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1997). State and federal courts have begun to disentangle 
these privileges in the wake of that decision. See, e.g., Freedom Found., 310 P.3d at 1261 n.6 (relying 
on In re Sealed Case to distinguish between two privileges). But see Vandelay Ent., 343 P.3d at 1278-
79 (continuing to mix elements of the two privileges). 
125 Dann, 848 N.E. 2d at 484; Freedom Found., 310 P.3d at 1260. 
126 Dann, 848 N.E. 2d at 485-87; Freedom Found., 310 P.3d at 1261-63. 
127 See Dann, 848 N.E. 2d at 484 (recognizing that the “same interests” are advanced in the 
gubernatorial context); Freedom Found., 310 P.3d at 1260 (noting that both the governor and the 
president are vested with executive power). 
128 See supra note 120. 
129 E.g., N. Jersey Media Grp. Inc. v. Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor’s Off., 146 A.3d 656, 667 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016). 
130 E.g., Va. Dep’t of Corr. v. Surovell, 776 S.E.2d 579, 584 (Va. 2015). 
2021] Secrecy Creep 1773 
and local government, under this view, creates a false dichotomy. Governors 
oversee the National Guard, after all, and mayors must shield their cities from 
national security threats.131 Further, national security information is routinely 
shared across these borders. In 2012, President Obama issued an entire 
directive dedicated to streamlining procedures for sharing classified materials 
with state, local, and tribal governments.132 
Such information sharing, however, creates less definitional confusion 
than might be expected. When state and local actors obtain access to national 
security materials, they are pulled under the broader umbrella of the federal 
secrecy regime. State and local actors who received classified information 
must abide by the same secrecy laws and regulations that bind federal 
officials.133 The mere possession of national security information passed along 
by federal actors does not meaningfully impact the distinct secrecy ecosystem 
that exists at the state and local level.
These lines become more blurred when state and local actors themselves 
generate intelligence information with a national security dimension.134 This 
happens most often in the law enforcement context. There is a long history of 
federal-state cooperation with intelligence gathering. Most infamously, police 
departments routinely assisted the FBI under Director J. Edgar Hoover in its 
investigations into civil rights and anti-war groups in the 1950s and 60s.135 Yet 
when these activities, and the abuses they entailed, eventually came to light, local 
police departments largely backed away from such collaborative efforts. Many 
shuttered their intelligence-gathering units altogether.136 
This changed again in the wake of September 11, when local police were 
reenlisted in federal intelligence-gathering efforts, this time in the fight 
against terrorism.137 Federal officials reasoned that police officers’ knowledge 
of local communities would allow them to recognize when something was 
amiss, permitting them to serve as the first line of defense against another 
domestic terrorism attack.138 A wealth of new federal-local intelligence-
131 See, e.g., 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 67, at 390 (noting the “growing role for 
state and local law enforcement agencies” in “identifying terrorist suspects”). 
132 OFF. OF THE CHIEF SEC. OFFICER, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CLASSIFIED 
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION PROGRAM FOR STATE, LOCAL, TRIBAL AND PRIVATE 
SECTOR ENTITIES (2012), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/mgmt-classified-
national-security-program-implementation-directive.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VT7-D2QA]. 
133 Id. at 7-8. 
134 I use the word “intelligence” to refer to information that is “gathered clandestinely through 
eavesdropping or other data collection methods . . . to provide a longer-term view of a problem and 
shape longer-term interventions.” RILEY ET AL., supra note 25, at 2. 
135 Waxman, supra note 25, at 298. 
136 See id. at 300-01 (citing litigation, embarrassment, and corruption as key motivators). 
137 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 67, at 390, 427. 
138 See id. at 427; RILEY ET AL., supra note 25, at 1. 
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gathering initiatives sprung up.139 These included fusion centers—or data-
sharing sites where federal, state, and local agencies share intelligence 
information—as well as joint terrorism task forces, or partnerships between 
federal and subfederal agencies to engage in counterterrorism efforts.140 
These arrangements have allowed state and local law enforcement agencies 
to funnel intelligence information to federal agencies. Yet they have not 
necessarily given rise to a profusion of national security secrets in state and local 
government. There is a rich body of cross-disciplinary literature examining the 
relationship between the federal national security agencies and local law 
enforcement agencies in combatting terrorism.141 It reveals that police 
departments have been largely relegated to the role of information gatherers in 
these joint federal-local efforts, collecting the raw data used to identify terrorism 
threats but rarely assisting with the intelligence analysis that converts this 
information into a more traditional national security secret.142 As one scholar 
put it, “local agencies lack the analytical resources to pull together the disparate 
data points that are gathered in the name of counterradicalization intelligence 
and stitch them into a coherent narrative.”143 In other words, even when the 
police engage in activities with a national security dimension, they do not 
necessarily gain access to national security secrets.144 
This leaves a final scenario. Some larger police departments operate not 
at the direction of the federal government but independently to combat 
national security threats.145 This presents the most difficult case: it is no 
accident that many of the examples of secrecy creep chronicled here arise in 
the context of the New York City Police Department, which has modeled its 
intelligence unit in the image of the CIA.146 Local agencies that function like 
national security agencies, one could argue, should have access to these 
heightened secrecy protections. 
139 RILEY ET AL., supra note 25, at 3. 
140 Waxman, supra note 25, at 333. 
141 See, e.g., Mathieu Deflem, Social Control and the Policing of Terrorism: Foundations for a Sociology of 
Counterterrorism, 35 AM. SOCIOLOGIST 75, 89 (2004) (predicting police departments will resist 
federalization of counterterrorism efforts); William J. Stuntz, Essay, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 
YALE L.J. 2137, 2138 (2002) (predicting an expansion of the power of local police in the wake of 9/11). 
142 See, e.g., RILEY ET AL., supra note 25, at 58 (“[I]t is striking how limited the analytic capacity 
is at the local level.”); Waxman, supra note 25, at 334 (“[M]any joint task forces do not actually 
provide opportunities for serious intergovernmental deliberation because their decisionmaking 
tends to be dominated by their federal leadership . . . .”). 
143 Samuel J. Rascoff, The Law of Homegrown (Counter)Terrorism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1715, 1735 (2010). 
144 For a definition of “national security secrets,” see supra note 22. 
145 There is no uniform definition of what constitutes a “national security threat.” The federal 
government has increasingly expanded the definition to encompass a wide variety of risk areas, 
including trade, travel, organized crime, and public health. See Donohue, supra note 22, at 1575. 
146 See discussion infra subsection II.D.2. 
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The most forceful response is that it is this model of policing that is flawed, 
not the bounds of the law. Rather than ramp up the secrecy tools of local law 
enforcement agencies to close the gap between these functional activities and 
formal legal protections, we should instead ramp down the national security-
type activities of local police departments. In other words, if this Article’s 
critique of secrecy creep breaks down along functionalist grounds, then the 
problem is the erasure of the functional lines dividing federal and local agencies, 
not the inadequate nature of police departments’ secrecy protections.147 
That being said, I do not argue that these secrecy tools must never be used 
in the state and local context. Some measure of secrecy creep may be justified 
under certain conditions.148 But such exceptions will be limited. And even 
accepting the possibility that some amount of secrecy creep is inevitable, even 
necessary, we must nonetheless remain thoughtful about the drawbacks of this 
process, and the ways that we might mitigate their more harmful effects. 
II. SECRECY CREEP
There is a wealth of scholarship addressing the topic of legal migration, 
or the process by which legal doctrines, concepts, tropes, and practices move 
over time.149 The entire field of comparative law could be framed as a study 
of the movement of legal ideas.150 A subset of this literature, however, 
explores legal migration specifically in the national security context. This 
scholarship is largely concerned with the ways that “extraordinary” 
circumstances can lead to legal exceptions that then ossify, becoming 
permanent fixtures in the law.151 
Much of this work is focused on the legal reverberations of the 9/11 
attacks. Scholars have explored, for example, how expanded information-
gathering and surveillance programs have watered down criminal processes 
in the United States,152 or the risk that prosecuting accused terrorists in the 
147 See discussion infra subsection III.B.4. 
148 See discussion infra Section III.A. 
149 Various terms have been used to describe this process, including “drift,” see J.M. Balkin, 
Ideological Drift and the Struggle over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV. 869, 871 (1993), “seep[age],” Gross, 
supra note 35, at 1097; “borrowing,” Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 35, at 463, and “migration,” Judith 
Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of 
Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1616 (2006). I use the term “creep” because of its association with the 
concept of “mission creep.” 
150 See generally ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE 
LAW (2d ed. 1993) (arguing that societies borrow laws from one another, making most law operate 
differently than originally intended). 
151 Gross, supra note 35, at 1097; see also DONOHUE, supra note 36, at 2 (“New powers end up 
being applied to nonterrorists—often becoming part of ordinary criminal law.”). 
152 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From 
 
Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 524 (2006) 
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domestic legal system will weaken domestic criminal protections more 
broadly.153 Professor Shirin Sinnar has tweaked this formula somewhat by 
examining legal migration in the opposite direction—into, rather than out of, 
the national security sphere.154 Specifically, she chronicles how the executive 
branch has taken legal terms of art from constitutional law and applied them 
in diluted form to the national security context, usually in an effort to 
persuade the public that the government is sufficiently constrained. She 
refers to this as the borrowing of “rule of law tropes.”155 And she warns that 
these tropes can become entrenched in the law, coalescing over time into an 
acceptable interpretation of the original doctrine or rule.156 
Here, I build on Professor Sinnar and others’ work by illuminating a 
distinct migratory stream: the movement of federal secrecy doctrines and 
rules out of the national security context and into state law. While legal 
scholars have long been preoccupied by the expansion of national security 
secrecy more generally, this particular migratory channel has been largely 
overlooked. Rather than examine the ratcheting down of due process 
protections as they cross into and out of the national security realm, this 
Article describes the ratcheting up of secrecy protections as they enter into 
the state and local context. 
Before exploring this process further, a clearer definition of “secrecy 
creep” is needed.157 As it is used in this Article, this term refers to: (1) a legal 
doctrine, rule, statute, or practice; (2) used to shield records or information 
from disclosure; (3) initially developed by the federal government to protect 
national security-related records or information; and (4) subsequently 
applied to protect state or local government records or information. The 
following sections explore some examples. 
A. Methodology
Any study of state and local law poses a research challenge. The universe of 
relevant actors is vast: each of the fifty states has its own executive, legislative 
(warning that the growth of the National Security State could wear away at “the civil liberties 
protections, checks and balances, and oversight by independent actors (e.g., judges) that we normally 
associate with the criminal process in the United States”). 
153 See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 37, at 1501 (“[T]hey put pressure on the courts to sanction exceptional 
departures from procedural or evidentiary norms that will eventually become settled as the rule.”). 
154 Sinnar, supra note 35, at 1609-12. 
155 Id. at 1609. 
156 Id. at 1611. 
157 This Article explores the way that national security secrecy protections have spread from 
the federal to the state and local context. But the term “secrecy creep” could be used to describe 
other migrations of secrecy tools—for example, throughout different substantive realms of a single 
legal system. See infra note 412 and accompanying text. 
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and judicial branches; and each state executive branch separately hosts dozens, 
sometimes hundreds, of state-level agencies.158 Further, there are roughly 90,000 
local government entities, and many local governments house a variety of 
smaller governing units, such as police departments, fire departments, zoning 
boards, and school boards. One state official estimated that there are 10,000 state 
and local governments and subgovernments in New York state alone.159 
In light of the complexities involved with studying state and local 
government, I began my research at the federal level. I first surveyed the 
existing scholarship exploring legal exceptionalism in the national security 
context,160 supplementing this literature with my own experiences litigating 
against various federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies.161 I then 
drew up an initial list of twelve federal secrecy tools that were developed 
specifically to shield national security secrets.162 
Next, I turned to state law and practice to determine which of these 
secrecy tools had begun to surface in the state and local context. In doing so, 
I relied upon both formal legal sources—such as state statutes and case law—
as well as less formal sources, including briefs, agencies’ public records 
responses, documents obtained through public records requests, and news 
reports. After I located one example of a federal secrecy tool being used in 
the state or local context, I then searched the records of other states to see if 
the same protections were being applied elsewhere. I primarily conducted 
this research by filtering for all state statutes or cases on Westlaw and then 
plugging in various keywords—for instance, “Glomar,” “confirm nor deny,” 
and “existence or nonexistence”—to see whether and where the response had 
158 See Koningisor, Deserts, supra note 39, at 1468-69. 
159 Id. at 1468 n.32. 
160 See, e.g., Kwoka, supra note 15, at 212-16 (examining judicial deference to national security 
claims); Margaret B. Kwoka, The Procedural Exceptionalism of National Security Claims, 97 B.U. L. 
REV. 103, 116-38 (2017) (examining procedural innovations developed to shield national security 
secrets); Susan Nevelow Mart & Tom Ginsburg, [Dis-]Informing the People’s Discretion: Judicial 
Deference Under the National Security Exemption of the Freedom of Information Act, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 
725, 734-752 (2014) (examining judicial deference to national security claims); Pozen, supra note 40, 
at 650-57 (examining mosaic theory claims). 
161 The author has litigated FOIA cases against the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives; CIA; Department of Defense; DEA; FBI; Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence; and Secret Service Agency; as well as engaged in administrative-level FOIA 
negotiations with a wide variety of military and intelligence agencies. 
162 This list includes the mosaic theory; the Glomar; deference to national security claims; 
excluding law enforcement agencies from statutory transparency oversight; the executive 
communications privilege; the state secrets privilege; classification; criminal laws prohibiting the 
unauthorized disclosure of classified information; the Classified Information Procedures Act; 
protections for national security information in immigration proceedings; leaks investigations; and 
protections for national security information under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. This 
initial list is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather concentrates on the most prominent of these 
federal secrecy tools. 
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spread. I concluded that of the twelve federal secrecy tools that I initially 
compiled, at least five had begun to migrate into state law.163 
This is an imperfect research method: the major case databases are 
incomplete,164 and it is virtually impossible to search state and local agency 
records in any systematic way. There is no centralized repository for state and 
local agency records, and few subfederal agencies even collect data on public 
records responses.165 As a consequence, the examples of secrecy creep that I 
provide in this paper are, by necessity, somewhat scattered and haphazard. In 
some cases, this makes it difficult to determine how representative these 
examples are of the broader legal trends they describe.166 For instance, only 
two states have enshrined the Glomar response directly into the text of state 
law.167 In contrast, it is impossible to determine exactly how widespread use 
of the Glomar is at the agency level: there are hundreds of thousands of state 
and local agencies operating across the country, and little substantive data 
available about public records denials.168 In spite of the limitations of this 
research approach, however, this survey of the legal migration of federal 
secrecy tools still allows for valuable, if preliminary, insights into a troubling 
recent development in the law. 
B. Secrecy Creep in the Judicial Branch
Secrecy creep is prevalent in the judicial branch. State judges have proven 
receptive to state and local officials’ secrecy claims, adopting a variety of 
informational protections from the federal context. This Section explores two 
categories of examples: state courts’ adoption of the presidential 
communications privilege to shield gubernatorial records; and their adoption 
of various judicial doctrines developed by federal judges to shield national 
security secrets under FOIA. 
1. The Gubernatorial Communications Privilege
In United States v. Nixon, the Supreme Court recognized a qualified 
privilege for the President’s communications, one that is rooted in separation 
163 See id. 
164 See generally Merritt McAlister, Missing Decisions, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 1101 (2021) (describing 
missing unpublished federal appellate decisions from Westlaw, LexisNexis, and Bloomberg Law). 
165 Only two states—Vermont and Massachusetts—aggregate public records data, and they do 
so only for state-level agencies. Koningisor, supra note 39, at 1480. 
166 I’ve addressed the representativeness of each secrecy tool in the sections below: for 
executive privilege, see supra note 121; for Glomar responses, see infra notes 167–68; for the mosaic 
theory, see infra note 229; for national security deference, see infra note 243; and for institutional 
isomorphism, see infra notes 286–91 and accompanying text. 
167 IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-3-4.4 (West 2020); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 807 (West 2020). 
168 See supra note 165. 
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of powers principles.169 A number of state supreme courts have since 
imported this decision into state law, relying on Nixon to establish an 
analogous constitutional privilege for gubernatorial communications.170 In 
this way, the gubernatorial communications privilege easily fulfills three of 
the four definitional prongs of national security secrecy creep: it is an 
informational protection developed in the federal context that has since 
migrated into state law. 
It is the final prong of this definition—the protection’s origins in the 
national security context—that is less obviously satisfied. One view of the 
presidential communications privilege is that it derives from the President’s 
generalized need to preserve confidentiality in his communications, apart 
from any specific subject matter.171 There is some language in Nixon to 
support this view. The Court notes, for example, that the “need for protection 
of communications between high Government officials and those who advise 
and assist them in the performance of their manifold duties” is “common to 
all governments.”172 Under this reading, the privilege is rooted not in national 
security concerns but in a more universal need for high-level decisionmakers 
to engage in candid debate. The privilege less obviously qualifies as an 
example of national security secrecy creep. 
A second reading of Nixon, however, grounds the communications 
privilege more firmly in the President’s Article II powers,173 including her 
diplomatic and military responsibilities.174 Under this interpretation, the 
President has absolute authority to shield state secrets from disclosure, but 
she also enjoys a more generalized privilege that shields communications at 
the margins of these national security duties.175 The Supreme Court alluded 
to this view when it noted in Nixon that “[t]he need for confidentiality even 
as to idle conversations with associates in which casual reference might be 
made concerning political leaders within the country or foreign statesmen is 
too obvious to call for further treatment.”176 In other words, even if a 
communication does not meet the high qualifying threshold of a federal state 
169 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974). 
170 See, e.g., State ex rel. Dann v. Taft, 848 N.E.2d 472, 483 (Ohio 2006); Republican Party of 
N.M. v. N.M. Tax’n & Revenue Dep’t, 283 P.3d 853, 870 (N.M. 2012); Freedom Found. v. Gregoire,
310 P.3d 1252, 1261 (Wash. 2013).
171 Professor Mark Rozell refers to this as the “candid advice” defense of executive privilege. 
For a summary, see MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 46-48 (2002). 
172 Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705. 
173 See id. at 705-06 (stating that the privilege “has similar constitutional underpinnings” as 
those that “flow from the nature of [the] enumerated powers”). 
174 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
175 Professor Rozell refers to this as the “national security” defense of executive privilege. For 
a summary, see ROZELL, supra note 171, at 46-48, 50-51. 
176 Nixon, 418 U.S. at 715; see also Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2425 (2020) (linking 
executive privilege to the President’s role as commander of the armed forces). 
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secret, it may still prove integral to the President’s unique constitutional 
duties, including those related to national security. A central function of the 
privilege, under this view, is to provide the President with decisional elbow 
room to fulfill these responsibilities. 
Seen from this light, an incongruity emerges between the strong secrecy 
protections articulated in Nixon and the actual, day-to-day activities of a state 
governor. As one state supreme court justice noted in a dissent to his court’s 
adoption of Nixon, a governor has no duties comparable to the President’s 
national security activities, “no stealth bombers, nuclear weapons, or immediate 
plans for war.”177 There is “little, if anything, that the governor handles that a 
little more public scrutiny could drastically harm,” the Justice reasoned. “No 
death of American citizens or international conflict will result.”178 
One way to resolve the tension between these two readings of Nixon is to 
focus not on the fact of the privilege, but on its degree. Even if we accept that 
Nixon permits some form of protection for gubernatorial communications—
one rooted in governors’ valid need for “candid, objective, and even harsh 
opinions” in their decisionmaking processes179—it may not justify such a 
deferential rendering of the privilege. Nixon vests the President with a 
presumptive evidentiary shield, one that can be overcome only by a showing 
of need.180 A reviewing court will not reach the applicability of the privilege 
until this burden is met,181 and the opposing party must demonstrate 
particularized need even when allegations of misconduct by high-level 
officials are involved.182 Baked into this strong formulation of the privilege, 
under this view, is the President’s unique national security responsibilities. 
By extending such a deferential privilege to a governor—who commands no 
army and negotiates no treaties—the state courts engage in secrecy creep.183 
Put another way, there are two alternative ways to conclude that the state 
courts’ adoption of the privilege set forth in Nixon qualifies as an example of 
secrecy creep. Under the first, the presidential communications privilege is 
inextricably intertwined with the President’s unique diplomatic and military 
responsibilities under Article II, and by importing this privilege into the state 
context, courts improperly endow governors with secrecy protections 
designed to shield the national security state. Alternatively, even if one 
177 Freedom Found. v. Gregoire, 310 P.3d 1252, 1267 (Wash. 2013) (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
178 Id. at 1269. 
179 Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708. 
180 Id. at 708-09, 713. 
181 Id. at 713. 
182 In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
183 This view of Nixon has likewise surfaced in the state case law. See, e.g., Republican Party of 
N.M. v. N.M. Tax’n & Revenue Dep’t, 283 P.3d 853, 870 (N.M. 2012) (endorsing a watered-down
view of Nixon based on comparatively circumscribed gubernatorial duties).
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accepts that some privilege is needed to shield gubernatorial communications, 
importing the deferential privilege outlined in Nixon takes this protection a 
step too far. Adopting Nixon wholesale into state law vests a governor with 
secrecy protections designed to be strong enough to protect information at 
the margins of the President’s military and diplomatic duties. Both are 
plausible readings of Supreme Court precedent, and both support the 
conclusion that state courts have engaged in secrecy creep by adopting the 
privilege articulated in Nixon to shield their governors.184 
Further, this migration does not necessarily end at the governor’s door. 
One lesson that emerges from this study of secrecy creep is that secrecy tools, 
once imported into state law, rarely stay put.185 In that vein, local chief 
executives have begun to lay claim to a “mayoral” communications privilege 
as well. As noted, Cory Booker invoked the privilege while serving as mayor 
of Newark.186 There are other examples as well. The mayor of Anchorage, 
Alaska, for instance, has claimed the mayoral communications privilege to 
shield an economic report generated by an executive committee.187 And in 
Maryland, a county executive invoked the privilege to quash a deposition in 
a civil lawsuit concerning a fatal shooting by a county police officer.188 
The obvious legal flaw in these arguments is that mayors have no formal 
role in the state constitutional structure.189 The privilege’s origins in 
separation of powers principles would seem to foreclose its extension to local 
government altogether. And from a policy perspective, we may be hesitant to 
vest local officials with such broad secrecy powers: after all, the duties of a 
mayor are even more attenuated from the national security responsibilities of 
the President than those of a governor. The courts in Alaska, New Jersey, and 
Maryland all rejected these specific privilege claims, but they all left open the 
question of whether the mayor enjoys a communications privilege under state 
184 Scholars are likewise divided over the extent to which national security concerns animate 
the confidential communications privilege. Compare, e.g., ROZELL, supra note 171, at 44-46 (2002) 
(invoking national security secrecy as an “argument[] in favor of executive privilege”), with ROBERT 
M. PALLITTO & WILLIAM G. WEAVER, PRESIDENTIAL SECRECY AND THE LAW 195 (2007)
(criticizing Rozell for “refer[ring] repeatedly to national security as a potential justification for
executive privilege” when “the Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon drew a clear line between
matters that involve national security and those that do not”). Yet even Pallitto and Weaver
acknowledge that these lines tend to blur in practice. See, e.g., id. at 212 (noting that the Bush
Administration invoked the executive communications privilege to shield advisors’ 9/11 testimony
despite the obvious national security implications).
185 See discussion infra subsection III.B.3. 
186 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
187 City of Anchorage v. Anchorage Daily News, 794 P.2d 584, 593 (Alaska 1990). 
188 Johnson v. Clark, 21 A.3d 199, 212 (Md. 2011). 
189 See GARDNER, supra note 95, at 163 (noting that “most state constitutions grant the state 
legislature plenary power to create or dissolve local governments”). 
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law.190 Such claims help illustrate one of the perils of national security secrecy 
creep: these secrecy protections, once unloosed, can be difficult to contain. 
And the further away they move from their origins in the national security 
context, the shakier their legal and historical foundations become. 
2. The Glomar Response
In the mid-1970s, the CIA located a sunken Soviet nuclear submarine deep 
on the ocean floor. It spent $350 million building a ship that could surface the 
Soviet vessel, and then constructed an elaborate cover story: the inventor 
Howard Hughes would pretend that he had commissioned the ship for the 
purpose of mining manganese from the sea floor.191 To help keep its cover, the 
CIA named the ship the Hughes Glomar Explorer.192 But the mission was 
ultimately unsuccessful: the submarine broke into pieces as it was lifted from 
the ocean floor.193 
Word of the project soon leaked, and reporters began submitting FOIA 
requests to the CIA for records about the intelligence information obtained 
through the mission.194 This left the CIA in a bind. Acknowledging that it 
had responsive records might alert the Soviets that the program had failed, 
but stating that it had no responsive records would be a lie.195 A lawyer from 
the CIA came up with a creative solution. He told the reporter that either 
confirming or denying that the CIA had responsive records would reveal 
whether the covert program existed, which was itself a national security 
secret.196 This became known as the Glomar response. 
The Glomar has vexed countless FOIA requesters in the decades since. 
These responses are notoriously difficult to challenge. Federal courts are 
highly deferential to Glomar claims, permitting them to stand so long as the 
agency provides a “logical or plausible” reason.197 Federal agencies routinely 
issue Glomars to protect government information that is already widely 
190 See Anchorage Daily News, 794 P.2d at 593 n.16; Johnson, 21 A.3d at 213 n.8; Trial Order at 5, 
Secondary Parent Council v. City of Newark, No. ESX-L-6937-11, 2012 WL 6695041, (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Law Div. Dec. 19, 2011). 
191 Phillippi v. CIA, 655 F.2d 1325, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
192 The vessel was built by the company Global Marine—hence the term “Glo-Mar.” Mili. 
Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 729 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
193 Id. at 728-29. 
194 Phillippi, 655 F.2d at 1327. 
195 See Radiolab, Neither Confirm Nor Deny, WNYC STUDIOS at 15:00 (June 4, 2019), 
https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/radiolab/articles/confirm-nor-deny [https://perma.cc/ 
W82Z-WDHA] (interviewing the CIA lawyer who created the Glomar response). 
196 Id. 
197 Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1103 (D.C. Cir.1982)). 
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known.198 As one federal judge noted, the response “encourage[s] an 
unfortunate tendency of government officials” to shield information that is 
“more embarrassing than revelatory of intelligence sources or methods.”199 
For many decades, the Glomar remained tethered to the national security 
context and confined to federal law.200 This is no longer so.201 In 2012, the 
Associated Press published a series of Pulitzer Prize-winning stories describing 
a secret New York City Police Department unit formed after 9/11 to surveil 
Muslim communities in New York.202 The program targeted 28 “ancestries of 
interest,” including “American Black Muslims,”203 and its disclosure elicited a 
fierce backlash from the public.204 In the wake of these revelations, two Muslim 
men, Talib Abdur-Rashid and Samir Hamshi, submitted a request for records 
relating to the NYPD’s surveillance of them. At the time, Hamshi was a 
graduate student at Rutgers University, while Abdur-Rashid served as a well-
known imam at a mosque in Harlem.205 The men reasoned that learning whether 
and how they had been monitored would help cast light on the nature and scope 
of the controversial program more broadly.206 
The NYPD responded with a Glomar, arguing that to either confirm or deny 
the existence of such records would allow the targets of law enforcement 
investigations to know that they were being surveilled. In doing so, the agency 
failed to cite any state law sources, relying instead on a federal FOIA exemption 
and various other federal statutes that shield national security-related 
information, including a provision that applies specifically to classified 
198 See id. at 378 (explaining that the Glomar cannot be waived by “mere public speculation, no 
matter how widespread”). 
199 ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 389 F. Supp. 2d 547, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
200 Although the response has its origins in the national security context, it has spread to other 
parts of the federal law. See infra note 412 and accompanying text. 
201 For an excellent discussion of state and local governments’ adoption of the Glomar 
response, see A. Jay Wagner, Controlling Discourse, Foreclosing Recourse: The Creep of the Glomar 
Response, 21 COMMC’N L. & POL’Y 539 (2016). I build on this work by exploring additional examples 
of state courts’ acceptance of the Glomar; as well as by exploring Glomar responses at the 
administrative level. 
202 Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, Inside the Spy Unit that NYPD Says Doesn’t Exist, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.law.uh.edu/faculty/eberman/security/ 
AP%20reporting%20on%20NYPD%201.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7GP-S4CT]. 
203 Id. 
204 Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, After Spying on Muslims, New York Police Agree to Greater 
Oversight, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6. 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/nyregion/nypd-spying-
muslims-surveillance-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/X2FS-4WZ9]. 
205 CJ Ciaramella, Meet the Muslims Suing the Cops for Their Own Surveillance Records, VICE 
(Mar. 29, 2016, 11:50 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/avymk4/meet-the-muslims-suing-the-
cops-for-their-own-surveillance-records [https://perma.cc/Z4FQ-G7TQ]. 
206 Abdur-Rashid v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 100 N.E.3d 799, 811 (N.Y. 2018). 
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information.207 The men decided to sue the city over the denial, and the case, 
Abdur-Rashid v. New York City Police Department, eventually made its way up to 
the New York Court of Appeals.208 There, the state’s highest court held that the 
agency’s use of the Glomar was permissible under the state public records law.209 
The decision was widely criticized by journalists, activists, and civil rights 
lawyers, who feared the decision marked only the beginning of the Glomar’s 
wider adoption into state law.210 A review of lower court decisions and 
administrative-level denials, however, reveals that this migratory process has 
already been underway for some time. In 2012, for example, the Supreme 
Court of Ohio allowed a county prosecutor’s Glomar response to proceed 
unchallenged.211 And in 2016, a New Jersey appellate court held that state and 
local agencies could refuse to confirm or deny the existence of records under 
the state public records law.212 
Further, a review of administrative-level records reveals that state and 
local governments across the country have been quietly issuing Glomars for 
years. The Pennsylvania State Police Department, for example, routinely 
refuses to confirm or deny the existence of police investigative records,213 even 
writing the Glomar into its public records policy.214 A county social services 
agency in Minnesota has issued a Glomar in response to a request for a 
207 See Brief of Petitioner-Respondent at 7, Hashmi v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, No. 631, 2015 WL 
13775379, at *7 (N.Y. App. Div. Oct. 14, 2015) (describing these denials and asking whether the 
“NYPD believes itself to be a federal agency dealing with national security issues”). 
208 100 N.E.3d 799 (N.Y. 2018). 
209 See id. at 807 (“[W]hen there is a FOIL request as to whether a specific individual or 
organization is being investigated or surveilled, the agency—in order to avoid ‘tipping its hand’—
must be permitted to provide a Glomar-type response.”). 
210 See, e.g., Jonathan Peters, State Court Rules that Local Agencies Can Use a Classic CIA Tactic to Evade 
FOI Requests, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (June 8, 2016), https://www.cjr.org/united_states_project/ 
new_york_freedom_of_information_glomar.php [https://perma.cc/AG5Q-29ZX] (“Unfortunately, given 
the significance and novelty of the ruling, the court didn’t address some of the media’s major concerns in 
much detail, or at all.”); Tim Cushing, NY Appeals Court Gives NYPD Even More Opacity By Upholding Its 
‘Glomar’ Powers, TECHDIRT (Apr. 3, 2018, 3:23 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20180401/ 
10113539539/ny-appeals-court-gives-nypd-even-more-opacity-upholding-glomar-powers.shtml [https:// 
perma.cc/6LM9-JDS7] (criticizing a government disclosure exemption that allows an agency to be 
“belligerently indifferent to its obligations to the public”). 
211 State ex rel. McCaffrey v. Mahoning Cnty. Prosecutor’s Off., 976 N.E.2d 877 (Ohio 2012). 
212 N. Jersey Media Grp. Inc. v. Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor’s Off., 146 A.3d 656, 667 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2016). 
213 See, e.g., DiMartino v. Pa. State Police, No. 340, 2011 WL 10841570, at *2 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
Sept. 19, 2011) (affirming this response as consistent with the state’s open records law); Mahoney v. 
Pa. State Police, No. 339, 2011 WL 10841247, at *2 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Sept. 19, 2011) (same). 
214 See Right-to-Know Request, PA. STATE POLICE, https://www.psp.pa.gov/contact/ 
Pages/Right-to-Know-Request.aspx [https://perma.cc/J3LS-XQY3] (“To the extent that this request 
seeks or may be construed to seek Pennsylvania State Police records involving covert law enforcement 
investigations . . . the Department can neither confirm, nor deny the existence of such records without 
risk of compromising investigations and imperiling individuals.”). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3946513
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welfare benefits application.215 A police department in Tampa replied to a 
request for investigatory records with a Glomar.216 And police departments 
in multiple states—from Kansas217 to Florida218 to Maine219—have issued 
them in response to requests concerning police surveillance records. The 
Glomar has already spread throughout state law. 
3. The Mosaic Theory
The “mosaic theory” of information refers to the idea that individual 
pieces of data assembled together may reveal more than the sum of their 
parts. The concept itself is not new,220 but its salience has grown in recent 
years as technological advances have allowed for ever-larger datasets and 
increasingly sophisticated data analyses.221 The mosaic theory is perhaps most 
closely associated with the Fourth Amendment today, invoked by those 
fearful of government surveillance as grounds for establishing stronger 
protections against government searches.222 Yet this theory in fact originated 
in the inverse context—as a way for the government to shield information, 
especially national security information, from the public.223 
The government has long argued that broad swaths of information must 
be kept secret to prevent bad actors from assembling small, seemingly 
harmless facts into sensitive national security disclosures.224 Government 
agencies—and the federal intelligence agencies, in particular—have relied on 
the mosaic theory to justify withholding large volumes of records from public 
215 See Seeber v. Weiers, No. A04-288, 2004 WL 2283489, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2004) 
(“County staff also informed appellant that they were not permitted to confirm or deny the existence 
of any such application.”). 
216 Lorei v. Smith, 464 So. 2d 1330, 1331-32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
217 Letter from Jamie L. Cook, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Kansas City Police Dep’t, to Mike Katz-
Lacabe, Dir. of Rsch., Ctr. for Hum. Rts. & Privacy (May 4, 2015), https://twitter.com/mlacabe/ 
status/640974792342945792/photo/1 [https://perma.cc/PY2Q-DCUF]. 
218 Letter from Daniel L. Abbott and Samuel I. Zeskind, Attorneys for the City of Sunrise, Fla., 
to Nathan Freed Wessler, ACLU (Mar. 20, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/other/sunrise-fl-response-aclu-
refusing-confirm-or-deny-existence-responsive-records [https://perma.cc/ENS7-4Y26]. 
219 Curtis Waltman, Maine State Police “Can Neither Confirm nor Deny” Use of Cellphone 
Surveillance, MUCKROCK (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2016/nov/ 
09/msp-glomar [https://perma.cc/96QE-LYPW]. 
220 See, e.g., In re Edge Ho Holding Corp., 176 N.E. 537, 539 (N.Y. 1931) (“Very often the 
bearing of information is not susceptible of intelligent estimate until it is placed in its setting, a tile 
in the mosaic.”). 
221 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 n.6 (2012) (describing the “dragnet-type 
law enforcement practices” made possible by GPS tracking). 
222 Id. at 404-05. 
223 Maynard v. CIA, 615 F.3d 547, 562 (1st Cir. 1993). 
224 See FOIA Guide, 2004 Edition: Exemption 1, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (July 23, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-guide-2004-edition-exemption-1 [https://perma.cc/HFE5-TVS8] 
(claiming a statutory basis for the mosaic theory). 
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disclosure under FOIA.225 The federal courts, in turn, have granted 
substantial deference to the government’s mosaic theory claims, reasoning 
that judges lack sufficient expertise to determine what information poses a 
national security risk.226 They have accepted speculative claims of potential 
harm across broad categories of records.227 At the extreme end, they have 
essentially abdicated review over mosaic theory claims altogether.228 
This theory has now made its way into the state and local context as 
well.229 State and local officials have invoked the mosaic theory to withhold 
large categories of information, and state judges have largely deferred to these 
government claims. State and local law enforcement agencies, in particular, 
have turned to the mosaic theory to justify broad withholdings of public 
records. In the New York Glomar case, for example, the NYPD’s Chief of 
Intelligence argued that the mere fact of whether certain surveillance records 
exist “cannot be assessed in isolation, but rather forms part of a larger mosaic 
which can be used to analyze the NYPD’s counter-terrorism operations.”230 
The Court of Appeals, in turn, relied on this affidavit and the mosaic theory 
more broadly to justify its acceptance of the NYPD’s Glomar.231 
Other law enforcement agencies have asserted mosaic theory claims as 
well.232 This theory has repeatedly surfaced in litigation over records 
involving police departments’ use of cell site simulators, for example, more 
commonly known as Stingrays. These surveillance devices permit law 
enforcement agencies to gather a range of information from users’ phones, 
such as locational data or even the content of the user’s communications.233 
225 See Pozen, supra note 40 (summarizing mosaic theory cases). 
226 See, e.g., United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir. 1972) (noting that the 
courts are “ill-equipped” to review information classifications). 
227 Id. 
228 See, e.g., N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 219 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting its 
hesitancy “to conduct a judicial inquiry into the credibility of [] security concerns, as national 
security is an area where courts have traditionally extended great deference to Executive expertise”). 
229 It is difficult to determine how widespread use of the mosaic theory is: legal databases like 
Westlaw are incomplete, and there is no centralized database of public records responses to 
determine how often agencies invoke this theory in their administrative-level denials. See discussion 
supra note 168. I located the examples referenced here largely through different keyword searches of 
all state law cases in Westlaw. 
230 Affidavit of Thomas Galeti ¶ 43, Abdur-Rashid v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, No. 101559/2013, 
2014 WL 12738768 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 11, 2014). 
231 Abdur-Rashid v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 100 N.E.3d 799, 811 (N.Y. 2018). There are other 
examples of the NYPD invoking the mosaic theory. See, e.g., Asian Am. Legal Def. & Educ. Fund 
v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 964 N.Y.S.2d 888, 894 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (arguing against the release of
even redacted records because they contain “strands of information . . . [that] can still be used to
decipher sources, methods, and capabilities”).
232 The NYPD has also invoked the mosaic theory to protect other surveillance tools, such as 
the Z Backscatter x-ray van. See infra notes 256–57 and accompanying text. 
233 Cell-Site Simulators/IMSI Catchers, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 28, 2017), https:// 
www.eff.org/pages/cell-site-simulatorsimsi-catchers [https://perma.cc/4P7N-YYXB]. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3946513
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Law enforcement agencies have asserted mosaic theory claims to justify 
withholding virtually all records relating to their use of these devices. In 
Tucson, for instance, an FBI affidavit submitted in state court claimed that 
even minor details about the Stingray “may reveal more information than 
their apparent insignificance suggests because, much like a jigsaw puzzle, each 
detail may aid in piecing together other bits of information even when the 
individual piece is not of obvious importance in itself.”234 
The mosaic theory serves as such a powerful tool for the government 
because it is nearly impossible to argue against. Those seeking access to 
government information can rarely prove that a stray piece of information 
will not prove damaging, once combined with other, as-yet-unknown bits of 
data. This has spooked judges. As one federal court reasoned, “given judges’ 
relative lack of expertise regarding national security and their inability to see 
the mosaic, we should not entrust to them the decision whether an isolated 
fact is sensitive enough to warrant disclosure.”235 Pushed to its logical 
conclusion, the mosaic theory strips the judiciary of its ability to oversee 
government secrecy altogether.236 
4. Deferring to Government Assertions of Harm
There is a final procedural innovation developed to shield national security 
information that has recently migrated into state law: granting special deference 
to government assertions of national security harm. Under Exemption 1 of 
FOIA, classified records are protected from disclosure only when they have been 
“properly classified.”237 Congress included this provision to ensure the judiciary 
would exercise oversight of classified material, overriding a Supreme Court 
decision that restricted judicial review of classification decisions.238 
Despite Congress’s repeated insistence on de novo judicial review of an 
agency’s FOIA withholdings,239 however, federal courts have continued to 
rubberstamp the agency’s claims of national security harm. Specifically, they 
have accorded “substantial deference” to agency affidavits asserting that 
records are classified, requiring only that the agency’s withholding be 
“logical,” “plausible,” and made in good faith.240 Tellingly, although the statute 
itself proscribes de novo review of agency decisions, federal judges have 
234 Hodai v. City of Tucson, 365 P.3d 959, 964 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016). 
235 N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 219 (3d Cir. 2002). 
236 See Pozen, supra note 40, at 652 (describing the Third Circuit’s decision in North Jersey 
Media as an “abdication of mosaic theory review”). 
237 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). 
238 See Kwoka, supra note 15, at 213 (explaining that the new statute overruled the Supreme 
Court precedent in EPA v. Mink to require proper classification of documents). 
239 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). 
240 See, e.g., Maynard v. CIA, 986 F.2d 547, 555-56 (1st Cir. 1993). 
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referred to the standard of review in these national security cases as the 
“substantial weight standard.”241 This approach is unusual: as one experienced 
FOIA litigator put it, “Take any other type of civil litigation, and imagine 
how the suit would play out if the law required judges to presume that one 
side was telling the truth. And then imagine it being the side that also has 
exclusive access to the evidence. Welcome to FOIA.”242 
Yet this judicial innovation, too, has lately spilled over into state law. 
Specifically, the Virginia Supreme Court held in 2015 that state courts must 
accord “substantial weight” to the Virginia Department of Corrections’ 
determinations of harm under the state public records law.243 In reaching this 
decision, the court embraced the federal courts’ approach to national security 
disclosures under FOIA. The state court noted that in the national security 
context, the federal courts “accord substantial weight to an agency’s affidavit 
concerning the details of the classified status of the disputed record.”244 
Ensuring the security of state prisons, the court reasoned, is likewise “an 
extraordinarily difficult undertaking,” and therefore deference to the state 
corrections agency is equally warranted. On this basis, it concluded that state 
courts should accord “substantial weight” to the Virginia Department of 
Corrections’ assertions of harm.245 
In an echo of FOIA’s drafting history, the Virginia legislature ultimately 
overrode the court’s decision, amending the statute the following year to 
prohibit courts from according any weight to an agency’s determination that an 
exemption applies.246 Even so, the decision illustrates how easily secrecy 
innovations developed by the federal judiciary can make their way into state law. 
C. Secrecy Creep in the Legislative Branch
National security secrecy creep is less prevalent in the legislative branch, 
but it still occurs. Perhaps the clearest illustration is the decision by a state 
legislature to enshrine these federal informational protections into state law. 
Indiana’s legislature, for example, amended the state public records statute in 
2013 to allow a Glomar response when it is needed to “preserve the integrity 
of a law enforcement investigation” or to “protect public safety.”247 While 
Congress could be seen as acquiescing to the Glomar by failing to override 
241 See, e.g., Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
242 David McCraw, FOIA Litigation Has Its Own Rules, but We Deserve Better, JUST SEC. (Mar. 
15, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/29974/foia-litigation-rules-deserve [https://perma.cc/HD2C-XA5S]. 
243 Va. Dep’t of Corr. v. Surovell, 776 S.E.2d 579, 585 (Va. 2015). This is the only example I 
found of the substantial weight standard being used in state law. 
244 Id. at 584 (quoting Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). 
245 Id. at 585. 
246 See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3713(E) (2020). 
247 IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-3-4.4 (West 2020); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 16, § 807 (West 2020). 
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this judicial innovation—the response itself appears nowhere in the text of 
FOIA248—state legislatures in Indiana and Maine have taken this secrecy 
measure a step further by actively encoding it into state law. 
Further, state legislatures have taken steps to exclude entire agencies—
and more specifically, police departments—from statutory transparency 
obligations. This is not a perfect example of secrecy creep. It is difficult to 
prove that efforts to carve these agencies out of statutory oversight originated 
in the national security context. But these state-level developments at least 
mimic the exclusion of the federal intelligence agencies from statutory 
oversight at the federal level. While FOIA technically applies to every federal 
agency, in practice it contains gaping holes for classified records and national 
security-related materials. This has the effect of excluding intelligence 
agencies like the CIA and NSA almost entirely from its reach.249 
A comparison can be made to the exclusion of state and local police 
departments from state transparency laws. In Colorado, for example, the state 
legislature has carved state and local law enforcement agencies out of the state 
public records law altogether, enacting a separate and weaker law to govern the 
disclosure of police records.250 In other states, certain exemptions sweep so 
broadly that they have the practical effect of excluding police materials almost 
entirely. Perhaps most famously, New York until recently extended robust 
statutory protections for police personnel records, shielding even substantiated 
instances of police misconduct from public view.251 This exclusion of police 
departments from general transparency obligations at the very least tracks the 
“rise and rise” of national security secrecy in the federal context.252 
D. Secrecy Creep in the Executive Branch
Executive agencies, especially state and local law enforcement agencies, have 
independently facilitated secrecy creep, apart from the secrecy tools delegated 
to the executive from the judicial and legislative branches. This Section explores 
how law enforcement agencies’ adoption of the tools and tactics of the national 
security state has separately facilitated the process of secrecy creep. 
248 See 5 U.S.C. § 552. 
249 See, e.g., CIA, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT ANNUAL REPORT (2018), https:// 
www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA_FY2018_FOIA_Annual_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/B54A-
VCYD] (showing that the CIA granted in full only around 5 percent of the FOIA requests). 
250 See generally Colorado Criminal Justice Records Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-72-301 to -
309 (2020); see also id. § 24-72-305(5) (permitting law enforcement agencies to withhold records 
when disclosure would be “contrary to the public interest”). 
251 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50a (repealed 2020). 
252 See Pozen, supra note 39, at 154. 
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1. Adopting Federal Surveillance Tools
A vast physical infrastructure supports the national security state, ranging 
from massive data warehouses to miniscule listening devices.253 Increasingly, state 
and local law enforcement agencies are utilizing this infrastructure, especially 
these physical tools of surveillance.254 And as these surveillance devices migrate 
from the national security context into state and local policing, the informational 
protections used to keep these tools secret have inevitably followed. 
The Z backscatter van, for example, is a vehicle outfitted with an x-ray 
device powerful enough to scan cars and buildings as it passes by. Initially 
developed by a private company, the military was an early adopter of this 
technology, purchasing the vans as early as 2005 to scan for improvised 
explosive devices in Afghanistan and Iraq.255 
Eventually, the NYPD began using these vans as well. A reporter who 
learned of this new surveillance technology submitted a state public records 
request to the NYPD for documents relating to the acquisition, use, and safety 
testing of these vehicles. The city refused the request, relying on various federal 
secrecy tools to justify its denial. It invoked the mosaic theory, for example, to 
argue that the documents could be “combined with other strands of information 
that are already publicly available” to allow bad actors to circumvent the 
technology.256 And it advanced the Glomar-type claim that whether or not the 
NYPD had even purchased the vehicles was itself a protected secret.257 
253 See, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Sec. Agency, Groundbreaking Ceremony Held for $1.2 Billion 
Utah Data Center (Jan. 6, 2011), https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/press-room/Article/1630552/ 
groundbreaking-ceremony-held-for-12-billion-utah-data-center [https://perma.cc/EYT7-QU8F] 
(describing a one million square-foot data center); Aaron Kofford, Cross-Domain Maritime 
Surveillance and Targeting (CDMaST), DEF. ADVANCED RSCH. PROJECTS AGENCY, 
https://www.darpa.mil/program/cross-domain-maritime-surveillance-and-targeting [https:// 
perma.cc/U989-VAB5] (describing surveillance tools research). 
254 See generally Kevin D. Haggerty & Ricard V. Ericson, The Military Technostructures of 
Policing, in MILITARIZING THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 43, 54-59 (Peter B. Kraska 
ed., 2001) (describing the transfer of military technologies). 
255 See $9.5M for Special Z-Backscatter Scan-Vans to Afghanistan & Iraq, DEF. INDUS. DAILY 
(Aug. 4, 2005, 8:37 AM), https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/95m-for-special-zbackscatter-
scanvans-to-afghanistan-iraq-0967 [https://perma.cc/A95J-NZ5T] (showing a $9.5 million contract 
with the military in August 2005); Z Backscatter Van, HOMELAND SEC. TECH., 
https://www.homelandsecurity-technology.com/projects/z-backscatter-van-zbv 
[https://perma.cc/LTK5-AYKC] (technology first sold in 2003). 
256 Resp. Mem. of Law in Support of the Verified Answer at 4-5, Grabell v. N.Y.C. Police 
Dep’t, 996 N.Y.S.2d 893 (Sup. Ct. 2014) (No. 100580/2013). Note that the author represented the 
petitioner in Grabell. All discussions in this Article are based on publicly available information, and 
not on anything learned while counsel. 
257 Aff. of Richard Daddario in Support of the Verified Answer at 7, Grabell (No. 100580/2013) 
(“[A]cknowledging the existence itself of any contracts . . . would allow the recipient to determine 
the number of any vans purchased.”). 
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The Stingray offers a further example of the ways that acquiring federal 
surveillance technologies can lead state and local law enforcement agencies to 
borrow federal secrecy protections. Police departments have routinely issued 
Glomar responses to withhold information about the device from the 
public.258 They have also taken unusual steps to shield these surveillance tools 
from the view of other government actors. They have omitted references to 
the device in court orders and warrant applications, for example, implying 
that officers would obtain information from the telephone company directly 
when they in fact intended to use a Stingray.259 And they have withheld 
operational details from the elected officials tasked with overseeing police 
departments, often upon the request of federal law enforcement agencies.260 
In this way, the adoption of federal surveillance technologies has opened the 
door to the use of federal secrecy protections. 
2. Institutional Isomorphism: The Case of the NYPD
This Article’s final illustration of national security secrecy creep is distinct 
from the examples outlined above. Rather than focus on the formal legal tools 
imported into the state and local context, it explores the ways that state and 
local actors have adopted federal secrecy behaviors more broadly. Specifically, 
it illustrates how local police departments have begun to mimic various 
features of the national security state. Sociologists have referred to this 
broader process of institutional homogenization as “institutional 
isomorphism.”261 This theory, though not a perfect fit, serves as a useful lens 
through which to examine police departments’ acquisition of the traits and 
characteristics of the national security agencies.262 
The sociologists who first described this process of institutional 
isomorphism identified three discrete mechanisms of institutional 
convergence: coercive, mimetic, and normative.263 Coercive isomorphism 
arises when institutions respond to the same external forces, such as a shared 
258 See supra notes 217–19. 
259 See, e.g., United States v. Ellis, 270 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1147 (N.D. Cal. 2017); see also Manes, 
supra note 18, at 515-16 (summarizing efforts to shield Stingray records). 
260 See, e.g., Matt Richtel, A Police Gadget Tracks Phones? Shhh! It’s Secret, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/16/business/a-police-gadget-tracks-phones-shhh-its-
secret.html [https://perma.cc/D7N8-GJLG] (noting that county supervisors were denied access to 
even a description of the Stingray technology). 
261 Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and 
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 149 (1983). 
262 Scholars have previously applied the theory of institutional isomorphism to various legal 
contexts, including the diffusion of domestic criminal justice policies. See, e.g. Ashley T. Rubin, A 
Neo-Institutional Account of Prison Diffusion, 49 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 365, 375 (2015) (using institutional 
isomorphism to explain prison homogenization). 
263 DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 261, at 152-54. 
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legal system or common cultural pressures. Mimetic isomorphism occurs 
when institutions respond to uncertain circumstances by imitating the 
decisions and policies of other organizations operating in a similar space. And 
normative isomorphism describes the institutional homogenization that 
develops when policies and other organizational decisions are guided by 
shared professional norms.264 
Coercive isomorphism seems the least likely driver of secrecy creep. States 
are not, for the most part, bound by a shared external legal regime that 
incentivizes the adoption of these secrecy tools: to the contrary, these tools are 
often imported through public records laws unique to each state; or, in the case 
of executive privilege, through each state’s constitutional structure.265 On the 
other hand, less formal cultural pressures may exert greater force. In the wake 
of 9/11, for example, state and local governments almost certainly escalated 
government secrecy not only to ward off future attacks but also as a way of 
reassuring the public.266 A decade and a half later, however, it now seems equally 
likely that the opposite is true. The public has grown accustomed to increased 
openness and transparency in government, or at least to efforts that gesture in 
this direction, and the adoption of these federal secrecy tools likely defies the 
public’s expectation of increased government access.267 
Mimetic isomorphism, in contrast, seems a more likely driver of secrecy 
creep. When confronted with novel claims about preserving public safety, 
some state judges have resolved their uncertainty by reaching for secrecy tools 
adopted by the federal judiciary—especially in cases where federal judges are 
perceived to be more “legitimate or successful” in balancing the public’s 
competing interests in security versus transparency.268 Language in some of 
the state court opinions adopting these federal secrecy tools suggests an 
unusual level of deference to federal judges in the face of these national 
security-type secrecy arguments.269 
264 Id. 
265 See generally Koningisor, supra note 39. Federal laws incentivizing military weapons transfer 
to state and local law enforcement may play a role, to the extent that federal secrecy tools are used 
to shield these weapons. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2576a (authorizing the Secretary of Defense to sell 
equipment to state and local law enforcement agencies under certain conditions). On the other hand, 
these federal secrecy protections tend to be invoked more to shield federal surveillance technologies 
than military weapons. See discussion infra subsection II.D.1. 
266 See generally Marc Rotenberg, Foreword, Privacy and Secrecy After September 11, 86 MINN. 
L. REV. 1115, 1115-16 (2002).
267 See, e.g., Gregory S. McNeal, Institutional Legitimacy and Counterterrorism Trials, 43 U. RICH.
L. REV. 967, 976 (2009) (attributing the adoption of a program allowing media to visit Guantanamo
Bay to “the pressures arising from cultural and societal expectations of openness and transparency 
regarding prisons and detention facilities”).
268 DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 261, at 152. 
269 See, e.g., Abdur-Rashid v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 100 N.E.3d 799, 806 (N.Y. 2018) (“FOIA 
cases involving counterintelligence records are also particularly instructive.”); id. at 807 (“[T]he 
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Normative isomorphism, too, most likely plays a role. This is especially true 
when it comes to the present case study: the institutional isomorphism of the 
NYPD. Normative isomorphism describes the homogenization that occurs when 
policies and other organizational decisions are guided by shared professional 
norms.270 As individuals socialized within the particularities of a profession cross 
institutional lines, they bring with them “a similarity of orientation and 
disposition” that carries over into the new organizational context.271 
This process is evident in the post-9/11 evolution of the NYPD.272 In the 
wake of the September 11 attacks, the NYPD’s police chief restructured the 
Department’s Intelligence Bureau—a subdivision specializing in 
“intelligence-led policing”—and appointed David Cohen, the former CIA 
station chief in New York, as its head.273 Cohen, in turn, recruited a cohort of 
former CIA and FBI officers to serve beneath him,274 secured active CIA 
agents to work out of the NYPD bureau,275 and established the Demographics 
Unit, a secret division within the bureau tasked with surveilling Muslim 
communities in the New York area.276 
Under Cohen’s direction, the Intelligence Bureau began to mimic the 
structure, tactics, and objectives of the CIA.277 Cohen stationed police officers 
overseas to collect foreign intelligence information about terrorist threats,278 
for example, and sent an Intelligence Bureau detective to train at the Farm, 
analysis in the federal cases is instructive in the unique situation presented here.”); id. at 833 (Stein, 
J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for “endors[ing] a blind adoption of a federal judicial doctrine 
in analyzing a matter of state statutory construction”). 
270 DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 261, at 152-54. 
271 Id. at 152. 
272 See Intelligence, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/bureaus/ 
investigative/intelligence.page [https://perma.cc/KAP3-MJ85]. While the NYPD represents an 
extreme rather than a representative example, it is worth exploring in further detail because of the 
central role that large urban police forces play in the process of secrecy creep. 
273 See Michael Cooper, Ex-C.I.A. Spy Chief to Run Police Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 
2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/25/nyregion/ex-cia-spy-chief-to-run-police-intelligence. 
html [https://perma.cc/VA2T-873P]. 
274 See Christopher Dickey, The Inside Story of the CIA and the NYPD, DAILY BEAST (July 11, 2017, 
10:38 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-inside-story-of-the-cia-and-the-nypd [https://perma.cc/ 
782F-WPDM] (reporting on a number of former CIA and FBI officers who joined Cohen at the NYPD). 
275 See DAVID B. BUCKLEY, INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT OF THE OIG PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 
INTO THE CIA-NYPD RELATIONSHIP, at ¶ 15 (2011) (“Since 2002, CIA has assigned a total of four 
officers to provide direct assistance to NYPD.”). 
276 Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, With CIA Help, NYPD Moves Covertly in Muslim Areas, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 24, 2011), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/with-cia-help-nypd-
moves-covertly-in-muslim-areas/1926933 [https://perma.cc/7HR7-BSAA]. 
277 DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 261, at 149 n.2 (“By organizational change, we refer to 
change in formal structure, organizational culture, and goals, program, or mission.”). 
278 See MATT APUZZO & ADAM GOLDMAN, ENEMIES WITHIN 81 (2013) (“Cohen had begun 
stationing officers in foreign police departments so that in the event of a terrorist attack in, say, Paris or 
Toronto, the NYPD would have a direct line to information about the bomber and the device used.”). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3946513
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the CIA’s spy school in Virginia.279 He also secured an active CIA officer to 
school NYPD analysts in “analytic tradecraft,”280 and he selected a former 
CIA agent as the NYPD’s “scholar in residence.”281 
As the Intelligence Bureau adopted the structure and techniques of the 
CIA, it sought access to the same broad secrecy tools that these federal 
intelligence agencies enjoyed. Some of these efforts lacked a legal basis. The 
Bureau routinely labeled its documents “secret,”282 for example, even though 
there is no classification system at the state or local level and the markings 
had no legal effect.283 Other efforts elicited more formal protections. The 
Bureau secured expansive surveillance powers by persuading a federal judge 
to modify a decades’ old consent decree that had previously restricted the 
NYPD’s ability to investigate political activity, for instance.284 And it 
obtained approval to issue Glomar responses with the Court of Appeals’ 
decision in Abdur-Rashid.285 
The NYPD’s Intelligence Bureau offers the clearest example of this process 
of institutional modeling.286 But it is not the only one. Across the country, police 
departments have drawn closer to the national security state. And while these 
other agencies may not have experienced the same level of personnel cross-
279 Id. at 129. 
280 See BUCKLEY, supra note 275, at ¶ 9 (“[S]he engages exclusively in training NYPD analysts 
in analytic tradecraft.”). 
281 See Declaration of Marc Sageman in Opposition to Defendants’ Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment at ¶¶ 1, 3, Latif v. Lynch, 3:10-00750, (D. Or. Aug. 7, 2015), https:// 
www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/268._declaration_of_marc_sageman_8.7.15.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UZ5M-X8H9] (“I spent the following year as the scholar in residence at the 
[NYPD] . . . .”). 
282 See, e.g., DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, SPORTS 
VENUE REPORT 1 (n.d.), https://go.aws/36tAWaK [https://perma.cc/5599-K2FX] (“The information 
contained in this document is N.Y.P.D. secret. It is intended for official police use only.”); CYBER 
INTELLIGENCE UNIT, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T,, DAILY RNC BULLETS 1 
(2004), https://nyti.ms/2NZSULQ [https://perma.cc/A2KQ-P8Q9] (same); Conor Friedersdorf, Is the 
NYPD Worse than the NSA?, ATLANTIC (Aug. 26, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/ 
2013/08/is-the-nypd-worse-than-the-nsa/279020 [https://perma.cc/A65U-CYUE] (stating that 
documents related to a new unit were stamped “NYPD SECRET” and outside the purview of “the City 
Council, Congress, and the White House”). 
283 See Matt Sledge, NYPD ‘Secret’ Classification For Documents ‘Means Diddly’ in Eyes of Legal 
Experts, HUFFPOST (Sept. 16, 2013), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/nypd-secret-
classification_n_3922276 [https://perma.cc/W2J6-X4BG] (“Unlike at the federal level, however, no 
statute or public executive order appears to support the use of the ‘NYPD Secret’ label.”). 
284 See Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 273 F. Supp. 2d 327, 329, 349-51 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(granting approval to modification of the Handschu Guidelines, the guidelines governing NYPD 
investigation of political activity, conditional on NYPD compliance with certain reporting and 
technical requirements). 
285 See Abdur-Rashid v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 100 N.E.3d 799, 813 (N.Y. 2018) (upholding the 
NYPD’s ability to neither confirm nor deny existence of records as compatible with FOIL and its policies). 
286 See BUCKLEY, supra note 275, at ¶ 3 (noting that the CIA Inspector General was “unaware of any 
similar relationships between the Agency and other local law enforcement entities in the United States”). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3946513
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pollination as the NYPD, these federal and subfederal agencies have interacted 
in other ways.287 There are now roughly 200 joint terrorism task forces in the 
country, for example, which provide police officers with access to classified 
materials and counterintelligence training.288 As early as 2002, three-quarters of 
state law enforcement agencies had a specialized counterterrorism unit, while 
more than half had a separate intelligence division.289 In a survey of 200 local 
law enforcement agencies, more than 40 percent reported formally participating 
with a terrorism-related joint task force,290 and some noted that their 
counterterrorism mandates were set by the FBI.291 
There are more specific examples as well. In Los Angeles, for example, 
police officers received counter-surveillance training modeled on the instruction 
that U.S. military teams targeting al-Qaeda fighters received in Afghanistan.292 
As police officers become increasingly socialized into the cultures and tactics of 
these federal agencies through these federal-subfederal interactions,293 law 
enforcement agencies may assume ever-stronger secrecy protections as well. 
E. The Mechanisms of Secrecy Creep
Any descriptive account of legal diffusion inevitably raises a broader set 
of questions about the pathways of this migration. Why has this downward 
flow of secrecy tools occurred? What causes this dispersion of secrecy laws 
and norms? And how has it happened—what are the channels by which these 
federal informational protections travel? 
There are countless explanations for why governments pursue secrecy 
more generally. Max Weber famously argued that all bureaucratic 
organizations keep secrets in order to gain an advantage over rival entities 
287 The institutional isomorphism model also posits that the greater one organization depends 
on another, and the greater the centralization of resources, the more an organization will resemble 
those it depends on. DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 261, at 154-56. To the extent local police 
departments rely on federal funding, this power imbalance might help explain one of the 
mechanisms by which secrecy creep occurs. 
288 Joint Terrorism Task Forces, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism/joint-terrorism-
task-forces [https://perma.cc/3PY5-BTSM]. 
289 RILEY ET AL., supra note 25, at 7, 12-13. 
290 Id. at 17. 
291 See id. at 31 (“In one agency that has a small number of personnel devoted to counterterrorism 
efforts, the FBI sets the mandate through the agency’s participation on the JTTF.”). 
292 George L. Kelling & William J. Bratton, Policing Terrorism, CIVIC BULL., Sept. 2006, at 1, 3. 
293 DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 261, at 152-54 (describing the process of socialization across 
organizations); Eliav Lieblich & Adam Shinar, The Case Against Police Militarization, 23 MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 105, 117 (2018) (describing how military training of police officers can lead to the broader 
militarization of police). 
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who are not privy to the same information.294 Under this account, 
government bureaucrats will naturally seize whatever secrecy tools they have 
at their disposal in an effort to expand their power. Government officials, in 
contrast, tend to argue that such secrecy tools enhance the quality of 
governance. Scan the government’s brief in any public records case and you’ll 
find a litany of such utilitarian justifications: secrecy improves the quality of 
government decisionmaking, protects the public’s privacy, or disadvantages 
our enemies.295 Such generalized explanations, however, offer only limited 
insight. They may help explain government behavior more broadly, but they 
shed little light on the specific downward diffusion of secrecy tools from the 
federal to subfederal context. 
Lessons derived from the federalism literature, in contrast, offer a useful 
gloss to layer over these broader theories, permitting a more tailored inquiry 
into what motivates this specific legal migration. This scholarship offers up 
various explanations. Under the “trickle down” account of federal-subfederal 
national security relations, for example, secrecy creep could be chalked up to the 
downward flow of expanded federal powers to the states in the wake of 9/11.296 
For those concerned with the “spillover effects” of national security 
responsibilities,297 in contrast, secrecy creep could be attributed to the fear that 
local governments will underinvest in national security efforts because the 
benefits are so widely distributed. Under this account, the federal government 
may incentivize local participation in national security efforts by offering up 
federal weapons and informational protections in exchange for cooperation. 
Alternatively, the theory of “picket fence federalism” posits that federal and 
subfederal specialist agencies may end up pursuing policy goals that are more 
aligned with each other than with the non-specialist agencies within their own 
government.298 This affinity between agencies at different levels of government 
might offer yet another explanation for why secrecy creep is so prevalent in the 
law enforcement context. In the wake of 9/11, state and local law enforcement 
agencies were often conscripted to advance federal counterterrorism policy 
294 See MAX WEBER, Bureaucracy, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 193, 233 (H.H. 
Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 2d ed. 1991) (arguing that bureaucracy defends secrecy for the 
sake of power as against “the outside,” which may include an enterprise, a foreign, or even parliament). 
295 See Pozen, supra note 13, at 276-77 (describing such utilitarian justifications). 
296 See Waxman, supra note 25, at 313-14 (describing the trickle-down theory in the context of 
national security federalism); see also Stuntz, supra note 141, at 2139 (predicting that as the federal 
government expanded its authority in the wake of 9/11, “state and local governments can be expected 
to copy them”). 
297 See Waxman, supra note 25, at 339-43 (exploring spillover effects in this context). 
298 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Eleventh Amendment as Curb on Bureaucratic Power, 53 STAN. 
L. REV. 1225, 1236 (2001) (“‘Picket fence federalism’ refers to the tendency of agency officials to feel
primary loyalty to the federal agencies that share the state agency’s mission.”). This federalism
theory has obvious overlaps with the sociological theory of normative isomorphism described above.
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goals, sometimes over the objections of their own governments.299 These federal 
secrecy tools have helped to insulate these state and local law enforcement 
efforts, shielding the police from not only public oversight but also from 
oversight by generalist members of their own administrations.300 In that sense, 
secrecy creep might be seen as a kind of byproduct of picket-fence federalism: 
these informational protections allow state and local police to shield their 
activities from the view of their own governments, freeing them up to pursue 
policies that are more closely aligned with federal priorities. 
Ultimately, determining why state and local governments adopt federal 
secrecy protections is both complex and multifaceted.301 But what about how 
it occurs—which migratory paths do these informational protections travel? 
This description of secrecy creep suggests that these informational 
protections initially migrate from the federal to the subfederal context 
through the executive branches. Typically, a state or local official will see their 
federal counterpart exercise some secrecy authority and then attempt to 
secure this same power for themselves.302 
The more critical point of entry, however, seems to be through the 
judiciary, which must either bless or reject this adoption. This is how these 
secrecy tools ultimately travel from federal opinions into the decisions of state 
courts: state and local judges end up following the federal judiciary’s lead.303 
State courts’ longstanding reliance on federal interpretations of FOIA to 
guide their analysis of state public records laws, for instance, allows federal 
judicial endorsement of executive innovations like the Glomar and the 
substantial deference standard to slide easily into state law. 
In sum, the drivers of secrecy creep are manifold: a range of forces have 
likely led state and local governments to adopt increasingly powerful federal 
secrecy tools. But the pathways of this adoption are more straightforward. 
State judges, especially, have incorporated the analysis and holdings of federal 
299 See, e.g., Waxman, supra note 25, at 316-17 (describing city officials’ efforts to pull the police 
department from a federal-local joint terrorism task force). 
300 See, e.g., Richtel, supra note 260 (describing how Stingray NDAs prevented county 
supervisors in California from accessing information about the surveillance devices; and how the 
FBI has invoked the mosaic theory to justify such broad secrecy protections). 
301 Of course, political and historical forces are also at play: the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks 
unleashed a massive tide of national security efforts that reached state and local governments as well. 
See Waxman, supra note 25, at 316, 327, 330 (“[I]n the immediate aftermath of 9/11 . . . the Justice 
Department requested assistance from local police agencies in locating and questioning thousands 
of men holding nonimmigrant visas from countries where al Qaeda was thought to be active.”). 
302 Again, normative isomorphism offers one potential explanation: in the wake of 9/11, as 
federal secrecy expanded and federal-subfederal cooperation increased, state and local law 
enforcement officials may have had greater opportunity to observe federal secrecy practices. 
303 See, e.g., Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v. Rogers, 815 P.2d 900, 909-10 (Ariz. 
1991) (looking to FOIA to interpret state public records law); State Bd. of Equalization v. Superior 
Ct., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 342, 347 n.10 (Ct. App. 1992) (same). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3946513
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secrecy precedents into their own decisions, reasoning that the concerns 
motivating this expansion of secrecy at the federal level apply with equal force 
in the state and local context. As the next Part explores, however, this 
approach is often flawed—premised upon a federal-subfederal equivalence 
that ultimately proves false. 
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SECRECY CREEP
The effects of secrecy creep can be difficult to discern. Many of these 
secrecy tools have been adopted only recently into state and local law, and 
their long-term repercussions are not yet known. Further, the more successful 
these secrecy tools are, the less the public will know about how they are 
deployed. The extent to which these secrecy tools are used to shield 
government behavior—corruption, discrimination, violence—is, by design, 
almost impossible to determine. With these caveats in mind, this Part 
attempts to untangle the implications of secrecy creep: the benefits of 
applying retrofitted national security protections to the subfederal context, 
the costs they impose, and the ways that we might better cabin their use. 
A. The Benefits of Secrecy Creep
There are advantages to legal borrowing. This practice offers efficiency 
benefits, allowing government officials to adopt existing legal ideas rather than 
build the law from scratch.304 It is also effective: such borrowing permits 
government officials to utilize a legal idea or practice that has already been tested 
and proven persuasive in practice.305 Further, the idea’s connection to the legal 
system of origin may enhance its legitimacy in the eyes of the public.306 As two 
scholars of constitutional borrowing have noted, “because of path dependence, 
a line of argument or idea is far easier to sustain if it has already been introduced 
into an area of law than if it . . . must be raised for the first time.”307 
These efficiency, persuasion, and legitimacy benefits are all visible in the 
specific context of secrecy law. Borrowing federal informational protections 
most likely reduces the effort that state and local actors must expend 
304 See Alan Watson, Comparative Law and Legal Change, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 313, 326 (1978) 
(recounting the argument that borrowing law from elsewhere “can be the cheapest and most efficient 
way of changing the law and can at the same time give the most satisfactory result”). 
305 See, e.g., Abdur-Rashid v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 100 N.E.3d 799, 807 (N.Y. 2018) (adopting 
the Glomar into state law in part based on the federal courts’ justifications and reasoning). 
306 See Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History and 
Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 854-67 (2003) (offering 
an analysis of the legitimacy-generating effects of transplanted law through theory and example); 
see also Scott Dodson, The Gravitational Force of Federal Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 703, 739-40 (2016) 
(arguing that following federal law gives state judges political cover). 
307 Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 35, at 476. 
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formulating their own rules and rationales.308 It prevents state and local 
governments from wasting their time on ill-conceived secrecy arguments or 
tools by allowing them to adopt legal innovations that have already been 
blessed by the federal courts and proven successful in practice.309 Further, 
these secrecy tools come with the imprimatur of the federal courts—even, in 
some cases, the Supreme Court.310 
The most significant benefit of national security secrecy creep, however, 
is also the most straightforward: it improves state and local governments’ 
ability to shield information. And there may be circumstances under which 
such robust secrecy protection are justified—when we might believe that state 
and local government actors should have the same capabilities as the federal 
government to withhold information from public scrutiny.311 As mentioned 
previously, one defense of secrecy creep is that national security secrecy tools 
should not be limited to the federal context because national security efforts 
themselves are not so confined.312 
In other words, while there is ample reason to be concerned about 
excessive secrecy in state and local government, there may also be limited 
circumstances under which these secrecy tools are warranted. Take the classic 
justification of government secrecy: the location of troops in wartime.313 An 
analogous subfederal secret might be the identities of undercover police 
officers infiltrating a domestic terrorism cell. Extra secrecy protections may 
be required to shield these officers from retaliation. 
Even if some measure of secrecy creep may be justified to protect the most 
sensitive state and local secrets, the difficulty lies in where to draw this line, 
and how best to prevent abuse of these secrecy tools once they are adopted 
into state and local law. The following Sections explore these and related 
questions. But it is important to acknowledge upfront that the secrecy creep 
can offer concrete benefits, including increased efficiency, enhanced quality 
of deliberations, and improved security.314 
308 See, e.g., Abdur-Rashid v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 100 N.E.3d 799, 807 (N.Y. 2018) (noting the 
utility of borrowing from FOIA case law). 
309 See id. 
310 See, e.g., State ex rel. Dann v. Taft, 848 N.E.2d 472, 484 (Ohio 2006) (citing Nixon to 
establish a gubernatorial-communications privilege). 
311 These arguments tend to take one of three forms: secrecy either protects individuals’ privacy; 
preserves candor in government deliberations; or prevents criminals from circumventing the law. 
312 See discussion supra Section I.C. 
313 See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (“No one would question but 
that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of 
the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.”). 
314 See generally Pozen, supra note 13, at 277, 287, 296-97, 301 (describing the benefits of secrecy 
under utilitarian, liberal democratic, and constitutional theory). 
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B. The Harms of Secrecy Creep
While there may be advantages to the subfederal adoption of federal 
secrecy tools, the disadvantages of secrecy creep are substantial. When state 
and local actors adopt national security secrecy tools, they import legal 
innovations developed against a distinct legal and historical backdrop into 
state law.315 This can lead to unexpected, even harmful, effects. It can produce 
discordance in the law, exacerbate concerns over the robustness of checks and 
balances at the state and local level, facilitate the horizontal spread of secrecy 
throughout state government, and allow local law enforcement agencies to 
evade public scrutiny. 
1. Legal Discordance
The migration of federal secrecy protections into state law can produce 
doctrinal inconsistencies—what scholars of legal migration have referred to as 
legal “discordance.”316 Federal secrecy tools are developed in a specific legal, 
historical, and political setting, and as they migrate across legal borders, this 
context shifts. The law and policy justifications undergirding these secrecy 
protections may become less stable, and these secrecy tools can sit uneasily 
within this new legal and historical framework. By introducing these federal 
secrecy protections into state law, legislators and judges may be forced to either 
ignore these contradictions or contort the existing law to accommodate them. 
a. Constitutional Discordance
These federal secrecy tools may conflict with state constitutional law. This
can be explicit: Florida’s Constitution contains an affirmative right of 
information access,317 for example, while other state constitutions contain 
unusually broad protections for the press.318 In these instances, broad secrecy 
tools may clash with the state’s constitutional text. But even when the text 
itself does not give rise to an especially expansive view of transparency in 
government, broader distinctions in constitutional structure at the state level 
may affect how these secrecy tools fit within this new legal framework. 
The executive communications privilege offers a useful illustration. The 
privilege outlined in Nixon is tethered to the scope of the executive 
315 See WATSON, supra note 150, at 116 (“Even when the transplanted rule remains unchanged, 
its impact in a new social setting may be different.”). 
316 See Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 35, at 469. 
317 FLA. CONST. ART. 1 § 24. 
318 See, e.g., Holmes v. Winter, 3 N.E.3d 694, 698 (N.Y. 2013) (citing the state’s strong tradition 
of press freedom to reject government secrecy claims). 
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responsibilities enumerated in Article II of the U.S. Constitution.319 The 
constitutional responsibilities of the governor, in contrast, are more 
circumscribed. Some state judges have argued that these constitutional 
distinctions render Nixon incongruous with the state constitutional scheme. 
They have noted the obvious textual distinctions: the governor, of course, 
does not serve as commander in chief of the military or head of the nation’s 
diplomatic affairs.320 But they have also pointed out broader structural 
distinctions—most notably, that the governorship in many states is a weaker 
position than the presidency. 
Every state has some form of plural executive, and some state 
constitutions provide for nearly a dozen elected executive positions, reducing 
the governor’s authority to both appoint and remove executive officials.321 
Many state constitutions also provide for the election of at least some state 
judges rather than vesting appointment authority with the governor.322 And 
roughly a dozen state constitutions permit the public to recall a governor.323 
All of these constitutional features limit the powers of the state executive 
further than the limitations on the President.324 
It is not only that the executive branch is diminished at the state level; the 
state legislative and judicial branches also enjoy expanded authority. While 
the federal Constitution limits Congress’s legislative authority to enumerated 
subjects, granting the remainder of its powers to the states, state constitutions 
do the opposite—they grant the state legislature all powers except those 
affirmatively prohibited.325 Similarly, while the federal constitution limits the 
jurisdiction of the judicial branch to “cases” and “controversies,”326 state 
constitutions tend to permit state courts greater latitude when developing 
rules of standing and adjudication. State courts, for example, routinely issue 
advisory opinions.327 These legislative and judicial powers are enhanced at the 
expense of executive power. 
Finally, as state constitutional law scholar James Gardner has noted, 
separation of powers principles may be construed more fluidly at the state 
319 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974). 
320 See, e.g., State ex rel. Dann v. Taft, 848 N.E.2d 472, 490-91 (Ohio 2006) (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). 
321 See GARDNER, supra note 95, at 169-70 (discussing the multiplicity of state elected executive 
officials and comparing the state framework to the President’s ability to appoint and remove subordinates). 
322 Id. 
323 Id. at 176. 
324 Cf. Tarr, supra note 95, at 334-35 (comparing common separation of powers structures 
among the states to the federal government). 
325 GARDNER, supra note 95, at 156. 
326 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
327 See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (authorizing advisory opinions); FLA. CONST. art. V, 
§ 3(b)(10) (same); ME. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (same); N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 74 (same).
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level.328 Rhode Island, for example, has a history of allowing state legislators 
to appoint members of executive agencies.329 And Connecticut and Nevada’s 
Constitutions permit legislative committees to disapprove of agency 
regulations.330 While each of these actions would violate separation of powers 
principles under the federal Constitution, state constitutions tend to 
apportion these powers less rigidly, blending the responsibilities of the 
branches in a way that the federal Constitution does not allow.331 
Not all constitutional differences point in this direction. Some 
distinctions vest the governor with comparatively greater authority than the 
President. Many state constitutions contain an explicit separation of powers 
provision,332 for example, and governors have consolidated their authority in 
recent years.333 Further, many state constitutions stipulate that state 
legislatures meet only infrequently, leading to a less-professionalized 
legislative branch with reduced capacity to check executive power.334 Such 
distinctions aggregate the power of the executive at the expense of the other 
branches. Even so, the fact of these constitutional differences—on both sides 
of the equation—at the very least suggests that separation of powers will be 
formulated differently at the state level. 
This view finds support in prevailing theories of state constitutional 
interpretation. There is an ongoing debate among judges and state 
constitutional law scholars over the extent to which federal interpretations of 
the U.S. Constitution should guide state court interpretations of analogous 
parts of state constitutions. In very simplified terms, many scholars and 
judges have argued that state courts should rely on their state’s distinct 
constitutional texts and histories when construing state constitutional 
provisions—even those containing language identical to the federal 
328 See GARDNER, supra note 95, at 160 (“Some state constitutions . . . implement a regime of 
horizontal separation of powers that is far more relaxed than the counterpart regime on the national level.”). 
329 In re Advisory Op. to the Governor, 732 A.2d 55, 71 (R.I. 1999). 
330 CONN. CONST. art. II, amended by CONN. CONST. art. XVIII; NEV. CONST. art. III, § 1(2). 
331 See GARDNER, supra note 95, at 161 (noting that some state constitutions “allow[] a degree 
of blending of powers that the national Constitution does not countenance”). 
332 Although many state courts have viewed these provisions as “declaratory statements of 
relationships,” not constitutional commands. Id. at 171. 
333 Miriam Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, 131 HARV. L. REV. 483, 485-86 (2017). 
334 See Koningisor, supra note 39, at 1540 (“The legislature is a low-paying, part-time position 
in forty states, and state legislatures convene far less often than Congress.”). 
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Constitution.335 State judges, in contrast, have often ignored these critiques 
and continued to look to federal precedent.336 
This debate has been largely limited to the construction of individual 
rights provisions, however, which bind state courts through the doctrine of 
incorporation.337 There is arguably even less justification for adopting federal 
constitutional precedent when construing the structural features of state 
constitutions, because the federal Constitution imposes no meaningful 
structural requirements on the states—there is, as Professor Gardner has 
noted, no “national constitutional principle of structure.”338 This critique calls 
into question state courts’ adoption of the presidential communications 
privilege outlined in Nixon, and lends support to the view that the state courts 
erred by adopting a federal privilege rooted in federal separation of powers 
principles. This theory of state constitutional interpretation provides yet 
another reason for exercising caution when adopting certain federal secrecy 
tools into the state constitutional context. 
b. Historical Discordance
These secrecy tools were also generated against a unique historical
backdrop. The Nixon Court, for example, relied on the secrecy of the 
constitutional drafting process to conclude that “[t]here is nothing novel 
about government confidentiality.”339 Many state constitutions, in contrast, 
were drafted in full view of the public. Pennsylvania and New York’s 
335 See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 92, at 1 (“If we are ever to produce a complete and accurate 
American constitutional history, we must recognize that without the state constitutions in force in 
1789 the national Constitution is an incomplete text. They must all be read together.”); William J. 
Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 503 
(1977) (arguing state courts should take an expansive approach to due process as the federal court 
retrench the doctrine); Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence 
of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1154 n.45 (1985) (citing authority supporting an 
independent interpretation to the Wisconsin Constitution). For a summary of the new judicial 
federalism movement, see James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. 
L. REV. 761, 771-75 (1992).
336 See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 92, at 194 (noting that state courts follow federal
constitutional doctrine in the “clear majority of cases”); see also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (requiring 
lockstep construction of searches and seizures provision). Legal scholars have also critiqued aspects 
of New Judicial Federalism. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 335, at 837 (“[T]he communities in theory 
defined by state constitutions simply do not exist, and debating the meaning of a state constitution 
does not involve defining an identity that any group would recognize as its own.”); Randall T. 
Shepard, The Maturing Nature of State Constitution Jurisprudence, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 421, 423 (1996) 
(criticizing Justice Brennan’s position that state constitutional law should be used to expand 
individual rights for its “outcome-based motivation”). 
337 WILLIAMS, supra note 92, at 245. 
338 GARDNER, supra note 95, at 261. 
339 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 n.15 (1974). 
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constitutional conventions held regular public sessions,340 for example, and 
Ohio released transcripts from the state’s constitutional convention to the 
public at the time of the debates.341 Federal secrecy tools may not account for 
such historical distinctions. What is considered commonplace in the federal 
context may indeed be “novel” to the states. 
Secrecy in state government also departs from federal tradition in other 
ways. Early state constitutions embody a deep suspicion of executive power, 
arguably even more so than the federal Constitution.342 These constitutions 
reflect the lingering memories of abuses inflicted by autocratic leaders, first 
by British colonial governors,343 and later by governors appointed by the 
Continental Congress.344 They stripped power from the executive and gave it 
to the legislature—what Professor Gordon Wood has referred to as a 
“revolutionary shift” in the structure of government, one that established the 
state governor as a “new kind of creature, a very pale reflection” of its British 
forbearer.345 Ohio, for example, drafted its constitution in 1802 with the 
explicit aim of reining in a despotic territorial governor.346 In pursuit of this 
goal, the drafters divided executive power across a multitude of elected 
positions in order to constrain executive authority.347 Even so, the Supreme 
Court of Ohio has recognized a sweeping gubernatorial privilege modeled on 
Nixon—one that the dissent criticized as insufficiently attuned to these 
distinct features of state constitutional history.348 
The inverse is also true. Not only do federal secrecy protections fail to 
account for historical practices unique to the states, but they also embody federal 
legal traditions that are unique to the federal context. The executive branch has 
340 DANIEL N. HOFFMAN, GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 14 (1981). 
341 See State ex rel. Dann v. Taft, 848 N.E.2d 472, 491 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) (“Unlike the 
federal constitution, Ohio’s Constitution was created in the open.”). 
342 See Lawrence M. Friedman, State Constitutions in Historical Perspective, 496 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 33, 37 (1988) (describing weak executive branches in early state 
constitutions). 
343 Friedman, supra note 342, at 37 (noting that “[f]ears of a strong executive reflected vivid 
colonial memories”). 
344 See id.; see also STEVEN H. STEINGLASS & GINO J. SCARSELLI, THE OHIO STATE 
CONSTITUTION 10-11 (2011) (noting that Ohio established “one of the weakest executive branches 
in any state” in reaction to an autocratic governor appointed by the Continental Congress). 
345 Gordon S. Wood, Foreword, State Constitution-Making in the American Revolution, 24 
RUTGERS L.J. 911, 915, 916 (2011). 
346 William P. Marshall, Essay, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and 
Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2451 (2006). 
347 Id. An opposing view of the unitary executive is that it would be easier to monitor and 
therefore constrain. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton) (a unitary executive is 
more “narrowly watched and readily suspected”). 
348 See State ex rel. Dann v. Taft, 848 N.E.2d 472, 493 (Ohio 2006) (Pfeiffer, J., dissenting) 
(“The framers of the constitution stripped the Governor of Ohio of all power and made him a mere 
dummy to fill the Governor’s chair.”). 
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long exerted plenary control over foreign affairs,349 for example, and federal 
secrecy tools expressly reflect this practice.350 Yet this legal tradition has no 
analogue in the states; state judges have not abdicated judicial oversight of 
matters relating to local police in the same way.351 Importing these secrecy 
protections may conflict with state historical practice in this way as well. 
c. Policy Discordance
It is not only that the legal and historical underpinnings of these federal
secrecy tools can weaken as they migrate into the state context. The policy 
justifications undergirding these robust secrecy protections can break down 
as well. Federal judges presiding over FOIA cases, for example, defer to 
executive branch determinations of national security harm on the grounds 
that “[t]he judiciary ‘is in an extremely poor position to second-guess’ the 
predictive judgments made by the government’s intelligence agencies.”352 
This unusual level of deference is rooted in the judiciary’s concern about its 
lack of expertise when it comes to assessing threats to the national security. 
Such concerns are diminished in the state and local context. State courts 
are better equipped, for example, to preside over assertions of law 
enforcement harm. As one state judge observed, while “[m]ost CIA endeavors 
will never see the light of day, let alone that of a courthouse; the destiny of 
every successful NYPD investigation is to appear before a judge.”353 The 
federal courts may be less equipped to evaluate national security threats,354 
the judge reasoned, but the state courts “are not similarly handicapped in 
judging the soundness of [public records] exemptions based on police, 
privacy, or other justifications.”355 Under this view, one of the central policy 
motivations for granting the government wide latitude in its secrecy claims 
simply does not hold up in the state and local context. 
There are other examples. Many of the powerful federal secrecy tools 
chronicled here are justified in part by what Professor Jonathan Manes has 
referred to as the “anti-circumvention” argument,356 or the claim that if 
349 See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (explaining 
that sole authority over international relations resides with the president). 
350 See, e.g., Wilner v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 592 F.3d 60, 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (describing the court’s 
reluctance to judicially review matters related to national security). 
351 See, e.g., Abdur-Rashid v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 100 N.E.3d 799, 816 (N.Y. 2018) (Wilson, J., 
concurring) (“Our government features neither a unitary executive tasked with the national defense 
nor an elaborate system of classified information to which courts routinely defer.”). 
352 Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
353 Abdur-Rashid, 100 N.Y. 3d at 816 (Wilson, J., concurring). 
354 Scholars have critiqued this view. See, e.g., Kwoka, supra note 15, at 212-16 (critiquing federal 
judges’ deference to government assertions of national security harm). 
355 Abdur-Rashid, 100 N.Y. 3d at 816 (Wilson, J., concurring). 
356 Manes, supra note 18, at 507. 
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information were to be released to the public, criminals could use it to evade 
capture and skirt the bounds of the law. But as Professor Manes notes, this 
argument only holds up if there are, in fact, bad actors sophisticated enough 
to both assemble and act upon these disclosures.357 
In other words, the release of government information is only damaging 
if someone who means to inflict harm is watching. And although difficult to 
prove empirically, it makes sense intuitively that such sophisticated bad actors 
are more likely to operate on a national or international scale. It seems more 
plausible that hostile foreign intelligence agencies are using information 
released by the CIA to exploit our national security weaknesses than it is that 
small-town criminals are using information released by their local police 
department to circumvent the law’s effects.358 Federal secrecy protections like 
the mosaic theory of intelligence are less defensible from a policy perspective 
if there are no bad actors out in the world gathering these strands of 
information. There must be someone assembling these disparate “tiles” into 
a comprehensible picture for such secrecy to be justified. 
2. Reduced Public Oversight
Questions of legal fit are not the only ones raised as these secrecy tools 
cross over into the subfederal context. These protections also interact with 
the broader architecture of state and local government in ways that risk 
magnifying their more harmful effects. This Section explores some examples, 
arguing that the effects of these secrecy tools are likely intensified by the 
distinct structural features of state and local government, such as reduced 
checks and balances, diminished public oversight, and increased risk of 
corruption and “deep secret” entrenchment. 
a. Reduced Checks and Balances
Many of the checks and balances that we take for granted at the federal
level—legislative investigations, split government, competitive elections—are 
either weaker or wholly absent at the state and local level. Governors have 
consolidated their power and authority in recent years,359 state legislative 
oversight is notoriously weak,360 and state executive and legislative branches tend 
to be controlled by the same party.361 The picture is even bleaker at the local level. 
357 Id. at 540-41. 
358 See id. (“The specter of terrorism drives secrecy with respect to run-of-the-mill policing.”). 
359 See Seifter, supra note 333, at 518-29. 
360 See Koningisor, supra note 39, at 1540 (explaining how state legislative oversight is weaker 
than congressional oversight at the federal level). 
361 Seifter, supra note 333, at 520. 
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Local governments frequently combine executive and legislative functions,362 
local governing councils are often dominated by a single party,363 and local 
elections are marred by poor turnout and noncompetitive ballots.364 These 
features make it difficult for both the public and the competing branches to 
exercise their oversight functions and bring harmful government secrets to light. 
There is also reduced government oversight in the specific context of state 
and local intelligence gathering. Many of the federal secrecy tools surveyed 
here operate within a double set of limitations in the federal context: they are 
subject to a broader system of government checks and balances, and then they 
must conform to a separate set of restrictions placed specifically upon the 
executive branch’s intelligence-gathering capabilities. The federal 
government established various formal oversight mechanisms to curb its 
intelligence activities in the wake of the intelligence abuses of the Cold War-
era: Congress created a permanent congressional intelligence oversight 
committee and enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,365 for 
example, and the executive branch adopted various internal restraints, such 
as executive orders limiting intelligence activities and inspector generals for 
national security agencies.366 
These checks to government surveillance authority are diminished, if not 
altogether absent, at the state and local level. While the federal government 
responded to these intelligence abuses by enhancing government oversight, 
state and local law enforcement agencies largely exited from the intelligence-
gathering space altogether.367 As Matthew Waxman has noted, between the 
1970s and 2001, “intelligence oversight at the federal level generally proceeded 
in parallel with intelligence atrophy at the local level.”368 As a consequence, 
when state and local law enforcement agencies re-entered the intelligence 
sphere in the wake of 9/11, they did so largely unshackled from these broader 
forms of oversight.369 
362 RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 28 (8th ed. 2016). 
363 Id. 
364 Davidson, supra note 26, at 626 n.291. 
365 Waxman, supra note 25, at 299-300. 
366 Id. 
367 Id. at 300; see Samuel J. Rascoff, Domesticating Intelligence, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 575, 593 (2010) 
(describing a “generation-long hiatus” of nonfederal actors in the domestic intelligence realm). 
368 Waxman, supra note 25, at 301. 
369 See, e.g., APUZZO & GOLDMAN, supra note 278, at 179 (noting that the NYPD Intelligence 
group was not “burdened” by the level of oversight directed at the FBI); MICHAEL PRICE, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., NATIONAL SECURITY AND LOCAL POLICE 31 (2013), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/NationalSecurity_LocalPolice_web.
pdf [https://perma.cc/BUL9-FVUK] (describing weaknesses in NYPD civilian review board). 
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Further, the oversight mechanisms that do exist at the state and local level 
are often ill equipped to check the police’s surveillance activities.370 Police 
oversight boards and internal affairs bodies are often unable to gain access to 
the information and materials needed to effectively regulate police 
surveillance activity.371 And the secrecy that shrouds these intelligence-
gathering efforts makes it difficult for the public to ascribe credit or blame to 
local law enforcement agencies for their counterterrorism efforts.372 
Moreover, even when certain localities do introduce more robust 
oversight mechanisms, the decentralized nature of policing means that such 
regulations are inconsistent and patchwork. As a consequence, state and local 
actors routinely borrow national security secrecy tools untethered from any 
broader oversight regime. These agencies benefit from federal secrecy 
protections without being bound by the same countervailing checks to their 
authority that constrain the federal government.373 The balance between 
liberty and security that is reached at the federal level does not necessarily 
carry over into the state and local context.374 
b. Reduced External Oversight
In a series of landmark decisions in the 1970s, the Supreme Court struck
a balance between the government’s interest in shielding national security 
secrets and the press’s interest in informing the public. Under these 
precedents, the government is largely permitted to keep information secret 
and the press is largely permitted to publish whatever information it manages 
to obtain.375 Alexander Bickel famously described this relationship as the 
“disorderly situation.”376 Cass Sunstein, in turn, has referred to it as the 
“equilibrium theory” of the First Amendment, one in which the government 
seeks to keep secrets, the press seeks to disclose them, and “[t]his competition 
ensures that if both follow their self-interest, the resulting system will work, 
as if by an invisible hand, to benefit the public as a whole.”377 Sunstein 
370 See Waxman, supra note 25, at 336 (describing why oversight mechanisms of national 
security interests at the local level are ineffective). 
371 PRICE, supra note 369, at 30 (oversight boards often lack subpoena power). 
372 See Waxman, supra note 25, at 327 (noting the secrecy of national security intelligence programs). 
373 See id. (addressing the local-federal dichotomy); supra note 369 and accompanying text. 
374 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive 
Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES 
L. 1 (2004) (describing this balance).
375 See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (The Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Neb. Press
Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
376 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 80 (1975). 
377 Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control of Information, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 889, 899 (1986). 
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compared this external push-pull to the internal system of checks and 
balances that forces government information into the light.378 
Equilibrium is only struck, however, if the government and the media are 
relatively equally situated. And this is vanishingly true at the state and local 
level. Local media is on the brink of collapse: one in five local newspapers 
closed between 2004 and 2018,379 and half of the counties in the United States 
no longer have a local daily newspaper.380 By almost any metric, the situation 
is bleak: advertising revenue is down; circulation is down; and the number of 
local reporters is down.381 In other words, not only are these formal 
intergovernmental checks weaker at the state and local level, but the external 
oversight provided by the press is also reduced. 
The collapse of local media, in turn, reduces the pathways by which 
information may become public. In the national security context, there are 
not only congressional oversight bodies and agency inspectors-general 
overseeing the national security state, but also a robust national media 
competing to unearth the government’s national security secrets.382 There are 
well-trodden paths by which national security secrets are leaked. 
Sophisticated actors from both the government and media serve as repeat 
players in the “game of leaks.”383 Many of these disclosures are authorized or 
semi-authorized by highly placed government officials.384 
In the state and local context, in contrast, these pathways are less defined 
or even absent altogether. It is more difficult to leak information when there 
are no media outlets to print the disclosure. And state and local officials may 
be less sophisticated in navigating these channels, unaccustomed to pressing 
on these extra-governmental levers of information disclosure.385 This makes 
it less likely that especially deep or destructive government secrets at the state 
378 Id. 
379 See PENELOPE MUSE ABERNATHY, UNC CTR. FOR INNOVATION AND SUSTAINABILITY 
IN LOCAL MEDIA, THE EXPANDING NEWS DESERT 8 (2018), https://www.cislm.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/The-Expanding-News-Desert-10_14-Web.pdf [perma.cc/45UP-UZGE]. 
380 Id. 
381 Id. at 14 (describing a forty percent decline in weekday print circulation); PEN AM., 
LOSING THE NEWS: THE DECIMATION OF LOCAL JOURNALISM AND THE SEARCH FOR 
SOLUTIONS 24-31 (2019), https://pen.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Losing-the-News-The-
Decimation-of-Local-Journalism-and-the-Search-for-Solutions-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
5CMV-W82F] (describing decline in print advertising). 
382 Media resources have continued to aggregate at the national level; the New York Times now 
has more digital subscribers than the Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, and all 250 Gannett 
newspapers combined. Ben Smith, Why the Success of the New York Times May Be Bad News for 
Journalism, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/01/business/media/ben-
smith-journalism-news-publishers-local.html [https://perma.cc/JL28-HT7N]. 
383 See, e.g., Pozen, supra note 12, at 530. 
384 Id. at 565-72. 
385 See Seifter, supra note 333, at 521-22 (describing state agencies as strapped for both 
resources and expertise). 
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and local level will come to light.386 It also accelerates the imbalance between 
secrecy and accountability that exists in many state and local governments. In 
places where the public’s access to information is already restricted, these 
powerful secrecy tools may prove especially harmful. 
c. Increased Risk of Corruption
Political scientists have long theorized that lower levels of government are 
more prone to corruption. Explanations for why this is so vary. Samuel 
Huntington famously argued that individuals at the top of the political hierarchy 
will view political power as a substitute for economic profit, while lower-level 
officials will compensate for their reduced political standing by exploiting their 
positions for financial gain.387 Others have argued that reductions in media and 
civil society attention favor concentrated special-interest groups at the state 
level,388 while still others point to diminished competition in state and local 
elections389 or a lack of checks and balances in the structure of local 
government.390 Efforts to resolve this debate have met with mixed results.391 
Some scholars, however, have used empirical methods to confirm that 
Huntington’s intuition was basically right392—that corruption does in fact 
increase “as one goes down the political or bureaucratic hierarchy.”393 
Assuming that this is so—that corruption is more prevalent at lower levels 
of government—then the adoption of these federal secrecy tools may 
compound this risk. These informational protections endow state and local 
officials with yet another tool to hide special interest capture and 
corruption.394 Studies have linked the amount and intensity of public 
oversight to the financial health of local governments: when newspapers close, 
for example, municipal spending goes up.395 These lower levels of 
386 See discussion infra subsection III.B.2.d. 
387 See, e.g., SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 68 (1968). 
388 See, e.g., Miriam Seifter, Further from the People? The Puzzle of State Administration, 93 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 107, 150 (2018).
389 See, e.g., David Schleicher, I Would, but I Need the Eggs: Why Neither Exit Nor Voice
Substantially Limits Big City Corruption, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 277, 284-89 (2011). 
390 See, e.g., Kimberly L. Nelson & Whitney B. Afonso, Ethics by Design: The Impact of Form of 
Government on Municipal Corruption, 79 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 591, 592 (2019). 
391 See, e.g., Gerald W. Scully, Rent-seeking in U.S. Government Budgets, 1900-88, 70 PUB. 
CHOICE 99, 100 (1991) (finding less rent-seeking at the local level). 
392 See, e.g., Rajeev K. Goel & Michael A. Nelson, Corruption and Government Size: A 
Disaggregated Analysis, 97 PUB. CHOICE 107, 115 (1998) (offering empirical data and analysis). 
393 See HUNTINGTON, supra note 387. 
394 Miriam Seifter, Further from the People? The Puzzle of State Administration, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
107, 168 (2018) (noting “languid” external oversight at state level). 
395 Pengjie Gao, Chang Lee & Dermot Murphy, Financing Dies in Darkness? The Impact of 
Newspaper Closures on Public Finance, 135 J. FIN. ECON. 445, 448 (2020). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3946513
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government, already more prone to capture, may be at further risk of 
corruption as they adopt these federal secrecy tools into state law. 
d. The Risk of Deep Secrecy
Sociologist Kim Lane Scheppele has delineated between “shallow” and
“deep” secrets. A shallow secret is one whose existence is known, even if 
specific details remain hidden; a deep secret is one whose very existence is 
unknown.396 The CIA’s covert black site program is an example of a deep 
secret: until the Washington Post broke the story, the public was unaware of 
the fact of the program.397 An example of a shallow secret, in contrast, is the 
nuclear codes. The public knows that nuclear weapons exist and that the 
President can deploy them, but it doesn’t know the specifics of the program—
for example, how the weapons may be unlocked.398 
Professor Scheppele largely concentrated on the private law implications of 
deep secrecy.399 Other scholars, however, have explored the implications of deep 
versus shallow secrets in the public law context.400 Professor David Pozen, in 
particular, has argued that deep secrets raise unique governance concerns, 
allowing power to aggregate in the hands of the powerful and denying citizens 
the information they need to make informed decisions about their government. 
While deep secrecy permeates the federal government, he contends, it is most 
closely associated with the national security state. The decisions made in the 
national security realm raise difficult legal and ethical questions, and they often 
carry the greatest political risks. Because the stakes are so high, national security 
decisionmakers naturally “gravitate toward depth.”401 
From this perspective, we might expect that state and local government 
secrets would tend to be shallow. After all, the everyday decisions of running a 
city or state generally do not involve the types of complex legal or political 
calculations that drive officials toward deep secrecy. Yet if we also believe that 
deep secrets flourish where public oversight is scarce, then state and local 
governments may prove to be unexpected sites of deep secrecy. The public’s 
ability to monitor the government is hindered in many places by ineffective 
396 KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS 21 (1988). 
397 Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2005), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2005/11/02/cia-holds-terror-suspects-in-secret-
prisons/767f0160-cde4-41f2-a691-ba989990039c [https://perma.cc/2F9M-V8NS] (exposing the existence 
of the black site program). 
398 See Russell Goldman, The ‘Nuclear Button’ Explained: For Starters, There’s No Button, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/03/world/asia/nuclear-button-trump-north-
korea.html [https://perma.cc/9RCC-L97N] (examining the unknowns of the nuclear program). 
399 See generally SCHEPPELE, supra note 396 (examining secrecy in the context of fraud, 
privacy, and implied warranties). 
400 See, e.g., Kitrosser, supra note 75, at 514-15; Pozen, supra note 13, at 261. 
401 Pozen, supra note 13, at 275. 
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transparency laws and weak civil society actors. In these locations, local 
governments may operate with little oversight—there may be no journalists, no 
local chapter of the ACLU, and no neighborhood watch groups overseeing state 
or local officials.402 The national security state, in contrast, is monitored by the 
deep and sustained efforts of activist groups and well-funded media outlets.403 
The vast resources dedicated to unveiling national security secrets make it more 
difficult for the federal government to shield deep secrets indefinitely. 
There are other facets of state and local government that might facilitate 
deep secrecy as well. Professor Pozen has argued that political competition 
often exposes deep secrets as one political faction unearths sensitive or 
controversial decisions taken by the other.404 And political competition is 
circumscribed at the state and local level. In 2019, only a single state—
Minnesota—had a divided legislature.405 State legislative and executive 
branches tend to be controlled by the same party as well.406 And political 
power is often even more concentrated at the local level: as local government 
scholar David Schleicher has noted, “there are almost no competitive 
legislative seats at the local level and there is usually no competition for 
control of the local legislature overall.”407 This lack of partisanship might also 
push state and local governments toward deep secrecy. 
Deep secrecy is almost certainly more prevalent at the federal level: the 
federal government, especially the national security state, has greater reason 
to keep deep secrets.408 But deep secrecy does exist in state and local 
government.409 Indeed, the very purpose of the Glomar response—
increasingly prevalent in the state and local context—is to protect deep 
secrets. And when such deep secrecy does occur, the structural features 
described above—ineffective transparency mechanisms and reduced political 
competition—may allow these deep secrets to persist. Put another way, state 
and local governments may be less inclined to engage in deep secrecy, but 
more successful in shielding those secrets from public view when they do. 
402 See Koningisor, supra note 39, at 1526-27. 
403 See supra note 382 (discussing the aggregation of media resources at the national level). 
404 Pozen, supra note 13, at 334. 
405 Timothy Williams, With Most States Under One Party’s Control, America Grows More Divided, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/11/us/state-legislatures-partisan-
polarized.html [https://perma.cc/Z8AQ-N8W5]. 
406 See Seifter, supra note 333, at 519. 
407 See David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in City Council Elections?: The 
Role of Election Law, 23 J.L. & POL. 419, 419 (2007) (contrasting the relative lack of competitiveness 
in local elections to those held on the national level). 
408 See Pozen, supra note 13, at 275 (“[D]eep secrecy may be most likely to occur, and to raise 
the most vexing problems, in the area of national security”). 
409 The NYPD’s surveillance of Muslim communities serves as an example: the program was 
established in 2002 but remained secret until the media broke the story in 2011. See Apuzzo & 
Goldman, supra note 202. 
2021] Secrecy Creep 1813 
Given the democratic concerns that deep secrecy raises, this dynamic might 
be another reason to exercise caution when vesting state and local 
governments with these federal secrecy tools. 
3. Intrasystem Secrecy Creep
Legal tools and concepts imported into a legal system to serve one 
purpose rarely remain confined to that realm. Rather, they become coopted 
for different ends, a process that scholars refer to as “intrasystem” legal 
migration.410 This phenomenon has been documented across a variety of legal 
contexts.411 But scholars and practitioners have raised specific concerns about 
the horizontal spread of the national security secrecy tools described here 
throughout the federal government. The Glomar response, for example, has 
been used to shield a variety of non-national security-related information, 
including the internal processes of the U.S. Postal Service and IRS 
whistleblower claims.412 
It is perhaps inevitable, then, that such intrasystem migration would occur 
within the state and local context as well. This process is already underway 
with the Glomar. In the wake of New York’s adoption of the Glomar into state 
law, the NYPD refused to confirm or deny the existence of records unrelated 
to a criminal investigation.413 And in response to a public records request that 
I submitted to the Pennsylvania State Police for records relating to its use of 
the Glomar, the law enforcement agency replied: “To the extent your request 
seeks or may be construed to seek records pertaining to covert law 
enforcement investigations . . . the [agency] can neither confirm nor deny the 
existence of such records . . . .”414 The agency responded to my request for 
records about the Glomar with a Glomar. 
These secrecy tools migrate not only horizontally, but vertically as well, 
from the state to the local context and vice versa. Efforts by city mayors to 
lay claim to an executive communications privilege offer an example.415 
Conversely, now that the Glomar is permissible in the local law enforcement 
context in New York, other state agencies may attempt to adopt it as well. 
410 See Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 35, at 464. 
411 See id. (exploring process in constitutional law); Tal Kastner & Ethan J. Leib, Contract Creep, 
107 GEO. L.J. 1277, 1279-80 (2019) (exploring this process in contract law). 
412 See Wagner, supra note 201, at 552-53. 
413 Decision and Order at 4, 6, Millions March NYC v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, No. 100690/2017, 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 14, 2019) (rejecting the NYPD’s claim). 
414 Letter from Lissa M. Ferguson, Deputy Agency Open Recs. Officer, Pennsylvania State 
Police, to author (May 16, 2019) (on file with author). This appears to be a boilerplate paragraph 
that is likely included in every public records response. 
415 See discussion supra notes 186–88 and accompanying text. 
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Such intrasystem movement is not inherently harmful. There may be 
limited circumstances under which the migration of these robust federal 
secrecy tools is justified, even in contexts distinct from the ones that gave rise 
to their initial adoption into state law. Yet the further a secrecy tool travels 
from its point of entry, the more attenuated it becomes from its original basis 
or justification. The example of Cory Booker’s emails illustrates the point: 
the privilege grew out of the desire to shield conversations with some nexus 
to the military and diplomatic responsibilities of the President; Booker’s 
office used it to shield emails about the Newark school system.416 
This type of intrasystem creep may allow secrecy to spread throughout 
state and local government, permitting government actors to shield 
information under circumstances far different from the ones that gave rise to 
the tool’s initial adoption. And if these secrecy tools drift too far from their 
origins—if, say, mundane information is denied with a Glomar—this could 
undermine public confidence in the law itself.417 
4. The “National Security-ization” of Local Law Enforcement
The process of police militarization—or the police’s adoption of the 
weapons, attire, tactics, and organizational structures developed for theaters 
of war—stretches back decades, if not centuries.418 But it accelerated in the 
wake of the 9/11 attacks, as funds earmarked for the fight against terrorism 
made their way to local police departments around the country, and federal 
initiatives like the 1033 Program authorized the military to transfer weapons 
no longer needed on the battlefields of Afghanistan or Iraq.419 Since the 1990s, 
local governments have received nearly $40 billion worth of military 
equipment—more than the entire annual defense budget of Germany.420 
The police have not only obtained the weapons of war, but they have 
gained access to the surveillance tools and tactics of the national security state 
as well.421 And as police import these weapons and surveillance technologies 
416 See supra note 5. 
417 See Sinnar, supra note 35, at 1611 (“[T]he recurring revelation of unnatural secret 
reinterpretations may erode trust in the law itself; if law can be twisted so far from its origins, is 
there any meaning left to the ‘rule of law’?”). 
418 See Rosa Brooks, Stop Training Police Like They’re Joining the Military, ATLANTIC: IDEAS (June 10, 
2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/police-academies-paramilitary/612859 [https:// 
perma.cc/LV4S-PUM7] (describing the military elements of nineteenth-century police forces). 
419 Id. 
420 See Dexter Filkins, “Do Not Resist” and the Crisis of Police Militarization, NEW YORKER (May 
13, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/do-not-resist-and-the-crisis-of-police-
militarization [https://perma.cc/L53M-69QD]. 
421 See discussion supra Section II.D; see also Michael German, The Militarization of Domestic 
Surveillance Is Everyone’s Problem, BRENNAN CTR. JUST. (Dec. 18, 2014), https:// 
 
www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/militarization-domestic-surveillance-
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into state and local government, the secrecy protections that shield them from 
public view are often imported along with them. The Stingray device and 
backscatter x-ray van offer an example. By adopting these surveillance 
technologies, police secured access to federal secrecy protections as well: the 
Glomar response, for example, and the protections that accompany the 
mosaic theory of intelligence. We might refer to this as a kind of “national 
security-ization” of law enforcement agencies, comparable to the 
militarization of local police. 
Further, as these secrecy shields grow more robust, there is less 
opportunity for the kind of public deliberation that might check the transfer 
of these weapons and technologies.422 After all, the public can only oppose 
government actions that it is able to perceive, and the entire purpose of these 
technologies is to operate covertly. Further, as scholars like Professor 
Catherine Crump have shown, local police departments routinely access 
powerful surveillance technologies in secret, or at least with minimal public 
input.423 This creates a feedback loop: stronger weapons and surveillance 
tools mean greater government secrecy; and greater government secrecy, in 
turn, allows for increased access to weapons and surveillance tools. 
There are additional risks. As state and local police acquire more powerful 
surveillance technologies and secrecy protections, they may begin to act more 
like national security agencies in other ways as well. The example of police 
militarization is once again instructive. Anthropologist Peter Kraska has 
defined “militarization” along four axes: material, cultural, operational, and 
organizational.424 A group of sociologists, in turn, has used this definition to 
untangle the broader effects of military weapons transfer under the 1033 
program. They have found that when police forces receive more military 
weapons and equipment—an increase in the “material” prong—they are more 
likely to become militarized along the other three axes as well. They are more 
likely to use military language, form elite units like SWAT teams, and jump 
into high-risk situations.425 
everyones-problem [https://perma.cc/S3TB-36DD] (describing state and local law enforcement 
adoption of the surveillance tools and techniques of the military and national security agencies). 
422 See, e.g., ACLU, WAR COMES HOME: THE EXCESSIVE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICAN 
POLICING 27 (2104), https://www.aclu.org/report/war-comes-home-excessive-militarization-
american-police [https://perma.cc/EFR7-4XJL] (explaining that of the 255 police departments the 
ACLU asked for SWAT records, 114 denied the request in part or in full). 
423 See Catherine Crump, Surveillance Policy Making by Procurement, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1595, 
1608, 1635-36 (2016) (discussing the transferal of sophisticated technology from national agencies to 
local police departments). 
424 Peter B. Kraska, Militarization and Policing—Its Relevance to 21st Century Police, 1 POLICING 
501, 513 (2007). 
425 Casey Delehanty, Jack Mewhirter, Ryan Welch & Jason Wilks, Militarization and Police 
Violence: The Case of the 1033 Program, RSCH. & POL., April–June 2017, at 1, 2. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3946513
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Secrecy creep introduces similar risks. Although cause and effect in this 
context is difficult to untangle,426 police departments, by adopting national 
security secrecy tools, may begin to imitate the national security agencies in 
other ways as well. As the example of the NYPD Intelligence Unit shows, 
when police agencies obtain national security secrecy protections—what we 
might think of as an operational feature—they may also behave more like the 
national security agencies along these other axes. The NYPD unit not only 
adopted the secrecy protections of the national security agencies, but it also 
secured the physical tools of surveillance utilized by the intelligence agencies 
(material),427 adopted the intelligence agencies’ language and tactics 
(cultural),428 and created administrative ties that strengthened its connection 
with federal agencies (organizational).429 
Put another way, if the problem with arming police officers like soldiers 
is that they start fighting a war, then the risk of vesting police officers with 
federal secrecy protections is that they begin to behave like national security 
agencies. Outlining the contours of secrecy creep offers an example of this 
“national security-ization” process. It shows how enhancing police access to 
one feature of the national security state may risk enhancing its access to 
others. The pull of this feedback loop may drag in other facets of the federal 
intelligence agencies as well, allowing state and local police to assume ever-
greater trappings of the national security state. 
C. Potential Remedies
There are costs and benefits to secrecy at every level of government. But 
as this Part has shown, excessive secrecy in the state and local context 
introduces unique threats: the countervailing checks on government power 
are often lower, for example, and the risk of deep secrecy higher. This Section 
explores potential remedies. It describes two broad categories of solutions: 
first, the government could act directly to contain or reverse the process of 
secrecy creep; second, government or external actors could act indirectly, 
weakening the effects of secrecy creep by building up oversight mechanisms 
that act as a counterweight to enhanced government secrecy. 
426 The authors of this study looked at whether obtaining military weapons caused 
militarization along the other axes. Id. I do not make any claims as to whether the adoption of federal 
surveillance technologies or secrecy tools is a cause or consequence of these other forms of “national 
security-ization.” 
427 See discussion supra subsection II.C.1. 
428 See discussion supra subsection II.C.2. 
429 Id. 
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1. Federal Government
The federal government’s ability to control the process of secrecy creep is 
limited: legally, by the strictures of federalism,430 and practically, by the vast and 
disaggregated nature of local government.431 Even so, there are ways that the 
federal government might be able to help at the margins. It could reduce the 
scope of federal-subfederal cooperation in the space where secrecy creep is most 
likely to occur: namely, within law enforcement agencies. It could lessen state 
and local actors’ access to the physical tools of surveillance, such as the 
safeguards imposed by the Obama administration to regulate the transfer of 
military-style weapons to police departments.432 Or it could limit state and local 
cooperation in federal intelligence-gathering efforts. Shrink these sites of 
federal and subfederal cooperation, and state and local governments’ 
justifications for obtaining these federal secrecy tools are likewise diminished. 
In reality, such efforts will most likely be stymied by practical 
considerations. Many of the surveillance devices described here originated 
with the federal government but ended up at least partially in the hands of 
private companies, making it difficult to control their dissemination.433 More 
importantly, the federal government has little incentive to scale back on such 
cooperation. In the intelligence-gathering realm, in particular, federal 
agencies are able to dramatically expand their reach by relying on thousands 
of state and local police officers.434 The federal government has little incentive 
to voluntarily limit the scope of such assistance.435 
Alternatively, the federal government could help counteract the effects of 
secrecy creep by enhancing its oversight of state and local government, especially 
state and local police.436 It could use its oversight authority to counterbalance 
the reduced checks and balances at the state and local level and help uncover 
government misconduct hidden behind these secrecy tools. Yet again, there are 
430 See Nathan James, Kristin Finklea, Natalie Keegan, Kavya Sekar & Richard M. Thompson 
II, CONG. RES. SERV., R43904, PUBLIC TRUST AND LAW ENFORCEMENT—A DISCUSSION FOR 
POLICYMAKERS 3-4 (2017) (describing the ways that federalism limits the federal government’s 
ability to oversee local police). 
431 See, e.g., Waxman, supra note 25, at 306 n.84 (describing this diffusion). 
432 Barack Obama, Commentary, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 
HARV. L. REV. 811, 843 (2017). 
433 See, e.g., Monte Reel, Secret Cameras Record Baltimore’s Every Move from Above, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 23, 2016), https://bloom.bg/37tQ1ul [https://perma.cc/T84B-DY3Y] 
(discussing Baltimore’s use of private sector technology for police investigations). 
434 See, e.g., 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 67, at 390. 
435 See Waxman, supra note 25, at 292 (assuming that continued subfederal involvement in 
national security efforts is a “political, practical, and historically contingent reality”). 
436 Avenues of federal oversight of local police include federal judicial oversight of 
constitutional violations inflicted by local law enforcement, as well as statutory authorities like 34 
U.S.C. § 12601 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7. 
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both political and practical limitations to consider. The DOJ has statutory 
authority to investigate patterns of unconstitutional misconduct by police, for 
example,437 and yet it exercises this authority only rarely. The Trump 
administration largely refrained from such efforts altogether.438 
There are other paths toward improved federal oversight. The federal 
government could provide enhanced supervision of cooperative federal-local 
intelligence gathering efforts. It could, for example, condition the receipt of 
federal funds on local police departments’ cooperation with federal 
intelligence guidelines.439 Yet even if effective, such steps would still treat 
only a narrow band of shared intelligence gathering activities. The harms of 
secrecy creep outside of these federal-local efforts would remain unaddressed. 
And none of these oversight options would counterbalance secrecy in other 
parts of the executive branch, outside of the policing context. In the current 
political climate, especially, enhanced federal oversight of the police is 
unlikely to serve as a meaningful check on state and local government secrecy. 
2. State Government
State government likely serves as a more promising site of reform. This 
holds true across all three branches. State legislatures, for example, could 
amend their public records laws to address specific instances of secrecy creep. 
They could prohibit or restrict use of the Glomar response, or close gaps in 
the laws’ coverage of state and local law enforcement agencies by relaxing 
protections for police personnel records or narrowing the scope of exemptions 
protecting law enforcement records.440 They could also overrule judicial 
adoption of federal secrecy tools, the way the Virginia legislature did in the 
wake of the state supreme court’s adoption of a federal deference doctrine.441 
State legislatures could take other steps as well. They could enact new 
laws to regulate specific surveillance devices: many states have already 
enacted statutes that regulate police departments’ use of drones, for 
instance.442 And they could empower state attorneys general to investigate 
allegations of police misconduct, similar to the federal statute that authorizes 
the Justice Department to investigate police departments that engage in a 
437 34 U.S.C. § 12601. 
438 Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Jefferson B. Sessions to Heads of Dep’t Components & 
U.S. Attorneys 1-2 (Mar. 31, 2017); see also Bell, supra note 29, at 2129 (noting that “[o]ne of the 
biggest shortcomings” of the law is that “its use is politically cyclical”). 
439 See Waxman, supra note 25, at 338. 
440 For example, California’s legislature enacted a law in 2018 to provide greater public access 
to police disciplinary records. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 832.7-8 (West 2020). 
441 See supra note 246 and accompanying text. 
442 See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 20, at 1853 (indicating that the thirteen states that have 
regulated drone use since 2013, most ban police drone use or impose a warrant requirement). 
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“pattern and practice” of unconstitutional activity.443 California has already 
passed such a law.444 
Governors could also exert stronger oversight authority. In some states, 
state attorneys general have enjoined city police departments from engaging 
in unconstitutional conduct under the doctrine of parens patrie.445 This 
authority could be used to regulate police activity where secrecy creep is most 
prevalent. The state executive branch could also take voluntary steps to 
constrain its authority: the governor could issue executive orders limiting 
certain intelligence gathering activities, for example, the way a series of 
presidential executive orders has limited the intelligence activities of the 
national security state.446 
It is the judiciary, however, that serves as the most likely source of reform. 
Judges have the greatest power to reverse the process of secrecy creep, or at 
least to mitigate its worst effects. State judges can and should be more 
skeptical of government efforts to import these federal secrecy tools. When 
these tools are rooted in constitutional principles, state courts could eschew 
lockstep constitutional interpretation and look afresh at state constitutional 
text and history.447 In doing so, they could serve as a check to federal secrecy 
creep, rejecting some of these federal secrecy tools as ill-suited to the state 
constitutional context. A number of state Supreme Court justices have taken 
this approach in dissents to their courts’ adoption of the executive privilege 
articulated in Nixon.448 These arguments may still yet prove persuasive, as 
more state courts are asked to rule on the existence and scope of a 
gubernatorial communications privilege. 
State judges could also ascribe more weight to these secrecy tools’ origins 
in the national security state. Litigants have repeatedly argued that these 
informational protections are too powerful to deploy outside of the national 
security context.449 These claims have proven only partially successful. But 
when considered against the broader backdrop of the state and local legal 
system, with its diminished checks and balances, they assume greater force. 
Judges could do more to consider these claims in the broader context of the 
443 See 34 U.S.C. § 12601. 
444 CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.3 (West 2020). 
445 See Jason Mazzone & Stephen Rushin, State Attorneys General as Agents of Police Reform, 69 
DUKE L.J. 999, 1007-12 (2020) (noting that state attorneys general have sought standing to enjoin 
local police departments under the parens patrie doctrine in Illinois, Pennsylvania, and New York). 
446 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,905, 3 C.F.R. 90 (1976). But see Eric A. Posner & Adrian 
Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 865, 912-13 (2007) (arguing that such executive 
self-binding may enhance rather than constrain executive power). 
447 See discussion supra notes 335–37 and accompanying text. 
448 See supra note 120. 
449 See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 24-26, Freedom Found. v. Gregoire, 310 P.3d 1252 (Wash. 
2013) (No. 86384-9). 
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state and local legal regime. And when these tools are adopted, state judges 
can and should articulate clearer rules about their use.450 Vague statements 
admonishing government actors to deploy these tools with caution will likely 
prove insufficient to cabin their spread.   
Further, state judges could be more skeptical of government claims of 
harm. Some have recently taken this approach with the NYPD. When the 
agency claimed that the release of safety tests would permit terrorists to 
circumvent the Z Backscatter Van, for example, the trial court noted that the 
city had offered “not even a hint” as to how this information would allow 
criminals to evade detection.451 By compelling local actors, and police 
departments in particular, to justify their adoption of federal secrecy tools, 
the courts will help to prevent their entrenchment in state and local law. 
3. Local Government
Local governments could likewise take steps to reduce the harms of 
secrecy creep. Once again, reining in police departments, where the effects of 
secrecy creep are most concentrated, offers a place to start. The bluntest tool 
to reduce the prevalence of secrecy creep would be to reduce the footprint of 
police departments altogether. Calls to defund the police are premised on this 
idea: shrink the size of the police, and you lessen the amount of violence that 
police officers can inflict.452 Reducing the scope of policing would likewise 
reduce the frequency and effects of secrecy creep. 
In lieu of reducing the size of the nation’s police force, improving public 
oversight of state and local law enforcement agencies could help mitigate the 
harms of secrecy creep. The literature on this topic is vast: scholars and 
policymakers have put forth countless proposals to penetrate police opacity and 
impose more accountable governance structures at the local level.453 A full 
accounting of this scholarship is beyond the scope of this project. That being 
said, improved oversight of police activity in general, and police intelligence-
450 See Abdur-Rashid v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 100 N.E.3d 799, 815-16 (N.Y. 2018) (Wilson, J., 
concurring) (arguing for clearer rules around use of the Glomar). 
451 Grabell v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 996 N.Y.S.2d 893, 902 (Sup. Ct. 2014), aff ’d as modified, 32 
N.Y.S.3d 81 (App. Div. 2016). 
452 See, e.g., Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 460-
79 (2018) (reciting demands of the Movement for Black Lives to shrink the power and resources of 
police); see also Bell, supra note 29, at 2147-49 (arguing in favor of “[s]hrinking the footprint of armed 
bureaucrats”). 
453 See, e.g., ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: 
SURVEILLANCE, RACE AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 190 (2017) (arguing for greater 
community involvement in police surveillance purchases); Maria Ponomarenko, Rethinking Police 
Rulemaking, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 45-46 (2019) (proposing “regulatory intermediaries”); FINAL 
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING (2015) (outlining a 
variety of proposals for police reform). 
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gathering efforts in particular, could help counteract the worst effects of these 
secrecy protections.454 Many of the proposals for enhancing local oversight of 
police more generally—expanding the authority of civilian oversight boards, 
enhancing community input regarding police surveillance, and so on—might 
also help counteract some of the harms of secrecy creep specifically. 
Local governments could also step back from these cooperative 
intelligence-gathering efforts altogether.455 This has already occurred in some 
cities. Portland withdrew from a joint terrorism task force, for example, after 
the city’s mayor decided he had been granted insufficient access to the task 
force to supervise it properly.456 City councils and mayors could also resist 
efforts by local police to obtain federal surveillance equipment, thereby 
disrupting the “national security-ization” feedback loop. This, too, has already 
occurred in some places. When the Seattle Police Department obtained two 
drones without City Council approval, for example, the mayor ordered that 
the agency give them away.457 Such steps could both lessen the instance of 
secrecy creep and provide more robust countervailing checks on government 
power when such creep does occur. 
Better ex ante regulation could also help. A number of scholars have 
proposed stronger rulemaking as a way to better constrain police.458 While 
the application of traditional rulemaking processes have been criticized on a 
number of grounds,459 these processes may be more effective in areas prone 
to secrecy creep. For example, scholars have argued that the rulemaking 
paradigm is especially well suited for regulating the adoption of surveillance 
technologies by police departments.460 None of these proposed solutions will 
act as a panacea. But governments at all levels can take incremental steps to 
address the problems associated with secrecy creep. 
454 See, e.g., Kate Taylor & J. David Goodman, New York Police Department’s Oversight Office, 
Fought by Bloomberg, Gets First Leader, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2014), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2014/03/29/nyregion/inspector-general-for-new-york-police-department-isnamed.html 
[https://perma.cc/H23U-GWVN] (reporting on the leadership of an oversight office created in 
response to complaints about excessive surveillance of Muslim communities). But see Mariame Kaba, 
Yes, We Mean Literally Abolish the Police, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2020), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2020/06/12/opinion/sunday/floyd-abolish-defund-police.html [https://perma.cc/MT6V-
HG6D] (arguing that such piecemeal reform is insufficient and more profound changes are needed). 
For a discussion of the limits of transparency, especially in the context of policing, see discussion 
supra note 29. 
455 See Waxman, supra note 25, at 314-18 (outlining the “trickle up” account of national security 
federalism, where local governments influence national policies). 
456 RILEY ET AL., supra note 25, at 13-14. 
457 Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 20, at 1853. 
458 See, e.g., id. 
459 See generally Ponomarenko, supra note 453 (describing the ways that traditional rulemaking 
is ill-suited to the policing context). 
460 See id. at 7 (describing the regulation of surveillance technologies as “fit[ting] comfortably 
within the [traditional] rulemaking paradigm”). 
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4. Civil Society
Perhaps the most promising source of reform is the sustained and 
persistent actions of civil society organizations and movements. The 
organizing efforts of the Black Lives Matter movement have helped unleash 
a wave of police reforms intended to make law enforcement agencies more 
transparent and accountable, from repealing New York’s notorious law 
shielding police disciplinary records to requiring the NYPD to disclose what 
surveillance technology it uses.461 Community efforts to reclaim control of 
government information—for example, through organized copwatching 
groups—serve as a counterweight to the expansion of legal forms of 
government secrecy.462 Such efforts have demonstrated civil society’s 
potential to rein in state and local government secrecy. 
The picture is less promising when it comes to another key component of 
the civil society ecosystem: the media. Yet a reinvigorated local press could 
likewise make great strides in helping to offset the more damaging effects of 
these federal secrecy tools. Armed with the financial resources required to 
engage in extended investigative efforts, the press could help reduce the 
threat posed by these secrecy protections. A stronger local media could help 
restore press-government “equilibrium,” minimize the likelihood of deep 
secrecy, and reduce the risk of corruption.463 
The project of reversing local media’s decline is immense.464 But in brief—
as I have noted elsewhere—recent innovations in local journalism show some 
promise.465 Some non-profit models have succeeded in filling the holes left 
by the collapse of local journalism—ProPublica’s new local off-shoot in 
Chicago, for example, or the Texas Tribune in Austin.466 Smaller and less 
costly media upstarts, such as the Vermont Digger and Berkeleyside, have made 
impressive inroads as well.467 
Other solutions have also been floated. Public funding for local journalism 
could help ease the financial pressures placed on media outlets, while 
improved regulation of social media behemoths could reduce technology 
461 See Press Release, N.Y.C. Council, Council Votes on Six Bills to Reform NYPD (June 18, 
2020), https://council.nyc.gov/press/2020/06/18/1990 [https://perma.cc/5YXS-BH3J]. 
462 See Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 391, 410-15 (2016) (describing 
community-based “copwatching” groups that “turn[] . . . surveillance instruments on those in 
power” by video recording police interactions). 
463 See Gao et al., supra note 395, at 466 (showing that when a local newspaper closes, the 
number of public employees, tax revenue per capita, and cost of municipal borrowing all increase). 
464 See, e.g., PEN AM., supra note 381, at 5 (describing the “current grave state of local journalism”). 
465 Koningisor, supra note 39, at 1545-47. 
466 PROPUBLICA, https://www.propublica.org/illinois [https://perma.cc/Z7ZY-BT6Q]; 
TEXAS TRIBUNE, https://www.texastribune.org [https://perma.cc/SY8M-DZL5]. 
467 VT DIGGER, https://vtdigger.org [https://perma.cc/WQ5J-CYQS]; BERKELEYSIDE, 
https://www.berkeleyside.com [https://perma.cc/NV6H-4E6X]. 
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companies’ ability to siphon off advertising revenue from media 
organizations.468 Such efforts are modest and piecemeal, and each faces legal, 
political, and logistical challenges. But breathing new life into the local 
press—by whatever means possible—would also serve as a powerful force to 
counteract this enhanced secrecy in local government. 
CONCLUSION 
Legal scholars have largely neglected the contours of the state secrecy 
regime, focusing attention either exclusively on the federal secrecy ecosystem, 
or, alternatively, on only a narrow slice of state secrecy. This has left broad 
swaths of important government activity unexamined. This project takes 
preliminary steps to remedy this gap, sketching out the architecture of the 
state secrecy regime more broadly. But it does so only in broad strokes. This 
descriptive account of the state secrecy ecosystem gestures to a number of 
topics that would benefit from future exploration: a more comprehensive 
exploration of deep secrecy in state and local government, for example, or a 
more thorough analysis of the interpretation of structural features of state 
constitutions. The Article tees up a number of such topics for further inquiry. 
More importantly, it identifies the most salient aspect of the state and local 
secrecy regime—the migration of national security secrecy protections into the 
state and local context—and explores it further. Years of organizing to protest 
police violence against Black communities has now opened up new space for 
reform—what political scientist John Kingdon has referred to as a “policy 
window.”469 The lens of secrecy creep can help inform these efforts by 
illuminating a critical yet overlooked aspect of police power. Lighting up these 
migratory channels allows judges and policy-makers to take steps to curb their 
most harmful effects. Further, it offers decisionmakers a framework within which 
to evaluate subfederal government secrecy claims, and it lends new urgency to 
the scholarly project of excavating secrecy in state and local government. 
468 See PEN AM., supra note 381, at 56. 
469 JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 165-95 (2011). 
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